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Executive summary and recommendations 
In December 2010, I was asked by the Minister for the Cabinet Office to conduct a 
review about the issues for privacy that were raised by the Coalition government‘s 
transparency  programme.  During  the  review  period,  experts  in  government,  civil 
society activists, academics and many others were consulted to try to reconcile the 
desire for open government with the privacy of individual citizens (who may be data 
subjects in datasets about government activity). Those who were kind enough to help 
the review are acknowledged at the end of the report. 
The review reached the following conclusions. 
  Privacy is extremely important to transparency. The political legitimacy of a 
transparency programme will depend crucially on its ability to retain public 
confidence.  Privacy  protection  should  therefore  be  embedded  in  any 
transparency programme, rather than bolted on as an afterthought. 
  Privacy and transparency are compatible, as long as the former is carefully 
protected and considered at every stage. 
  Under the current transparency regime, in which public data is specifically 
understood  not  to  include  personal  data,  most  data  releases  will  not  raise 
privacy concerns. However, some will, especially as we move toward a more 
demand-driven scheme. 
  Discussion  about  deanonymisation  has  been  driven  largely  by  legal 
considerations,  with  a  consequent  neglect  of  the  input  of  the  technical 
community. 
  There  are  no  complete  legal  or  technical  fixes  to  the  deanonymisation 
problem.  We  should  continue  to  anonymise  sensitive  data,  being  initially 
cautious about releasing such data under the Open Government Licence while 
we  continue  to  take  steps  to  manage  and  research  the  risks  of 
deanonymisation. Further investigation to determine the level of risk would be 
very welcome. UNCLASSIFIED 





  There should be a focus on procedures to output an auditable debate trail. 
Transparency  about  transparency  –  metatransparency  –  is  essential  for 
preserving trust and confidence. 
Fourteen  recommendations  are  made  which  are  intended  to  implement  these 
conclusions without making too strong a claim on resources. 
1.  Represent privacy interests on the Transparency Board. 
2.  Use disclosure, query and access controls selectively. 
3.  Include the technical paradigm. 
4.  Move toward a demand-driven regime. 
5.  Create a data asset register. 
6.  Create sector transparency panels. 
7.  A  procedure  for  pre-release  screening  of  data  to  ensure  respect  for 
privacy. 
8.  Extend the research base and maintain an accurate threat model. 
9.  Create  a  guidance  product  to  disseminate  best  practice  and  current 
research in transparency. 
10. Keep the efficacy of control in the new paradigm under review. 
11. Maintain existing procedures for identifying harms and remedies. 
12. Use data.gov.uk to raise awareness of data protection responsibilities. 
13. Investigate the Vulnerability of Anonymised Databases. 
14. Be transparent about the use of anonymisation techniques 
The grounds for these conclusions and recommendations are given in the body of the 
report, and the recommendations elaborated in detail in the final section. UNCLASSIFIED 





1  Introduction 
Transparency  as  practised  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  a  very  new  and  innovative 
phenomenon.  As  recently  as  2007,  a  trio  of  political  scientists  from  Harvard‘s 
Transparency Policy Project wrote one of the most important studies of transparency 
(Fung et al 2007), they focused on the mandatory publication of data by (usually) 
private sector outfits for particular purposes – not the voluntary publication of lots of 
data about anything and everything, available to anybody and everybody. This latter 
type  of  transparency  (they  called  it  3
rd  generation  transparency)  they  saw  as  ―a 
glimpse of a technology-enabled future‖, but erroneously imagined that government, 
though a coordinator of efforts, would not be a provider of data (Fung et al 2007, 151-
169). 
Similarly, as transparency is an innovation that came, if not out of the blue, at least 
very unheralded, the potential threat to privacy has not been considered and theorised 
to  any  great  extent.  In  September  2008,  a  special  edition  of  Scientific  American 
featured 12 articles on digital privacy by some of the finest commentators in the field, 
including Simson Garfinkel, Whitfield Diffie and Daniel Solove. Less than three years 
ago – yet transparency of government data was not mentioned once in the issue. One 
of the leading introductory textbooks on US privacy law, dating from 2008, does not 
include transparency in its closing survey of future challenges (Soma & Rynerson 
2008, 292-341) 
Yet we do need to think about these issues. A good government will have a range of 
interactions with its citizens, but it is essential that transparency of government does 
not lead to exposure of the citizen. This report will consider ways to prevent this from 
happening. 
I shall argue that a proper concern for privacy is not incompatible with transparency. 
The  proceedings  of  government  can,  and  should,  be  open  to  scrutiny  without 
compromising  citizens,  or  sacrificing  their  seclusion,  or  preventing  them  from 
keeping control of their self-presentation. I am optimistic that those pushing forward 
the transparency agenda in the United Kingdom are sensitive to privacy concerns, and 
will act accordingly. 
Indeed,  not  only  are  privacy  and  transparency  compatible,  privacy  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  a  successful  transparency  programme.  Transparency  requires  public 
confidence, and one way to ensure that is to reassure the public that its privacy is a 
central  concern whose  protection is  embedded  in  decision-making processes. This 
reassurance will only happen if the transparency programme is itself transparent, so 
that discussions and debates are open to inspection. 
In this report, I shall set out recommendations that I believe will allow the integration 
of privacy protection with transparency, and help preserve public confidence. My first 
task is introductory. Section 1.1 will set out the basic ideas and practices of the UK‘s 
transparency programme, to specify the context of this review. In section 1.1 I shall 
discuss the terms of reference of the review, and explain my interpretation of it – in 
particular, why I feel that privacy is the relevant and most important driver here, as 
opposed to the legalistic idea of data protection. Section 1.3 will then outline my 
approach, while section 1.4 will explain the report‘s overall structure. UNCLASSIFIED 





1.1  The practice of transparency in the United Kingdom 
The transparency programme of the UK  government is  a specific example of the 
transparency ideology in action. I will discuss the broader ideology in section 2.1 
below, but in this section I shall set out the immediate context which may be of value 
to the reader. 
1.1.1  The Coalition Agreement 
Transparency is an important part of the Coalition government‘s political agenda. The 
Coalition Agreement (Cabinet Office 2010) states: 
The government believes that we need to throw open the doors of public bodies, 
to enable the public to hold politicians and public bodies to account. We also 
recognise  that  this  will  help  to  deliver  better  value  for  money  in  public 
spending,  and help  us  achieve our  aim of cutting the  record deficit. Setting 
government  data  free  will  bring  significant  economic  benefits  by  enabling 
businesses  and  non-profit  organisations  to  build  innovative  applications  and 
websites. 
On this basis, the agreement makes a number of specific commitments, augmented by 
the Prime Minister‘s letters of 29
th May, 2010 and 7
th July, 2011 (Cameron 2010, 
2011). 
Transparency is clearly central to the government‘s plans. 
1.1.2  The government’s aims 
The government has set itself the target of making the UK the most transparent and 
accountable government in the world. By doing this, it hopes to achieve the following 
aims. 
  Making  government  more  accountable  and  approachable,  by  moving  from 
administrative  accountability  to  more  direct  democratic  accountability, 
enabling citizens to hold the government to account. 
  Creating better value for money by providing an insight into how money is 
spent, encouraging departments to improve controls on spending and reduce 
their costs. 
  Stimulating growth by enabling businesses to develop innovative information-
based products and applications using public data. 
  Reforming public services by: 
o  Providing  choice  and  improving  public  sector  outcomes,  by  giving 
citizens the information they need to make informed decisions about 
the public services they use, and giving providers the incentives they 
need  to  improve  the  quality  of  their  services  and  to  develop  new 
innovative services. 
o  Opening  up  public  sector  contracts,  giving  companies,  social 
enterprises,  charities  and  employee-owned  cooperatives  the 
opportunity  to  compete  to  offer  high  quality  services  by  providing 
access to public sector contract and procurement data. UNCLASSIFIED 





1.1.3  Institutional structures 
To implement these plans, the Cabinet Office contains a Transparency Team tasked 
with delivery of the transparency programme. An advisory body, the Public Sector 
Transparency Board, chaired by the Minister for the Cabinet Office, is charged with 
driving the policy. The Board has released a set of Public Data Principles which are 
intended to ensure that data releases are timely, valuable and reusable (Transparency 
Board 2010). A Local Public Data Panel plays a similar role to the Transparency 
Board with respect to data from local government. A website, data.gov.uk, is intended 
to act as an aggregator for public data releases in open and standardised formats. 
In  March,  2011,  it  was  announced  that  Tim  Kelsey  of  McKinsey‘s  would  be  an 
advisor to the government, supporting the Government in shaping its transparency 
agenda over a period of at least six months. 
A  new  UK  Open  Government  Licence  (OGL  – 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/)  was  launched  in 
September 2010 as a simple and straightforward set of rules to enable people to re-use 
government data in any way they want. The OGL implements the commitment not 
only to publish the data but to allow everyone to use it freely, helping to create a new 
era of social entrepreneurs. The licence is available in machine readable form, flexible 
and works in parallel with other internationally-recognised licensing models such as 
Creative Commons. The new UK licence does not require users to register or formally 
apply for permission to reuse data.  
1.1.4  Government agencies and third party suppliers 
The selection of data for release can be made on a number of grounds, including ease 
of  publication,  likely  value  for  the  public  and  so  on.  Currently  the  Transparency 
Board takes a lead in pushing for particular datasets to be published. 
It should be noted, however, that practical considerations are not the only ones driving 
decisions about what and what not to publish. Most government departments have 
discretion via common law powers over what they can and cannot publish – in other 
words, where they are mandated in law neither to restrict nor provide access to data, 
they can make a choice. Forthcoming right to data legislation is intended to promote 
data releases and give the public greater rights to ask for data (it also specifies that 
data should be released where feasible in reusable form). 
Other statutory bodies whose managers lack the powers of ministers are somewhat 
more restricted in what they can do, and their decision-making powers in this space 
are  determined  by  legislation.  Some  bodies  have  very  strict  requirements  of 
confidentiality laid upon them by the relevant acts of Parliament. An example here 
would be the 2005 Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act, which is intended 
to protect taxpayer confidentiality within Her Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs. 
In particular, it is worth noting that, although most such legislation would have been 
enacted  during  periods  of  government  when  transparency  was  not  valued,  where 
duties of confidentiality have been created by legislation there is usually good reason. 
In considering the privacy implications of data releases, the reasoning behind such 
legislation, where it exists, should be a factor in debate. 
With  regard  to  non-governmental  organisations  supplying  services  to  government, 
who may generate valuable data as a by-product of a government contract, one would UNCLASSIFIED 





not want to see a smaller commitment to transparency. It would be unfortunate indeed 
if a more efficient government that outsourced more functions became less transparent 
because it generated less data directly. 
In  the  case  of  both  non-departmental  government  agencies  and  non-governmental 
organisations, there is already a set of scrutinising principles in place to determine 
whether  a  release  of  information  is  justified  (and  to  what  extent  it  can/should  be 
redacted) under Freedom of Information legislation. Given the soundness of these 
principles, there seems to be little reason why transparency should not apply to these 
non-departmental  bodies,  by  following  the  FoI  principles  but  with  a  proactive 
publication  strategy  to  address  public  demand,  rather  than  a  reactive  publication 
strategy driven by orders from the government. 
1.1.5  Demand and supply, and the right to data 
Currently, releases of data are driven largely by the Cabinet Office, the Transparency 
Board and individual departments and agencies. Forthcoming right to data legislation, 
as noted, will give citizens a say in what information and data are provided. 
Hence it is fair to say that the transparency programme of the UK government at the 
moment is largely a top-down process. It is an aim of the Transparency Board and the 
Transparency Team to move toward a situation where demand for data was easy to 
register.  In  such  a  situation,  the  transparency  programme  would  become  a  more 
bottom-up, demand-driven process. That would be very much more in line with the 
underlying philosophy of transparency. 
The Cabinet Office is currently working to amend the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 to ensure that all datasets realised through FoI must be available for reuse and in 
a  reusable  format,  available  to  everyone  and  able  to  be  exploited  for  social  and 
commercial purposes. At the time of writing these legislative changes are included in 
the Protection of Freedoms Bill. Until the Bill is enacted, the advice is that public 
requests to departments for the release of government datasets should be handled in 
line with a presumption in favour of transparency, with all published data licensed for 
free  reuse  including  commercial  reuse.  Since  these  are  data  which  departments 
already have, or should have, this is not expected to involve significant costs or new 
IT systems. 
1.2  Terms of reference of the review 
The terms of reference that governed this review were set out in a letter from the 
Minister for the Cabinet Office. In particular, I shall focus on the sections of the terms 
that specify the purpose and remit of the review. 
1.2.1  Content of the terms of reference 
The terms of reference of the review were as follows: 
Purpose 
The Minister for the Cabinet Office has established a review of the impact of 
Transparency  on  Privacy.  The  Review  will  ensure  that  as  the  Government 
develops  its  transparency  agenda,  it  continues  to  uphold  high  standards  of 
personal privacy. UNCLASSIFIED 





The  Review  will  support  officials  and  Ministers  in  ensuring  that  on-going 
releases of data are done in a way that provides maximum transparency of data 
consistent with the appropriate data protection safeguards. 
Remit 
The Review will: 
  Support  the  Government  in  striking  the  right  balance  between 
transparency and data protection safeguards, and between the interests of 
wider society and the interests of the individual or corporate body. 
  Identify  the  nature  of  the  risk  to  privacy  of  the  individual  posed  by 
transparency  of  public  data,  in  particular  the  potential  for  ‗jigsaw‘ 
identification.  
  Advise the Government on practical approaches to take.  
1.2.2  Legal concepts of ‘privacy’ and ‘personal data’ 
Privacy is generally discussed in primarily legal terms, using instruments developed 
over many years including the relevant article (article 8) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Article 8 states: 
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right  except  such  as  is  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  is  necessary  in  a 
democratic  society  in  the  interests  of  national  security,  public  safety  or  the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the  protection  of  health  or  morals,  or  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and 
freedoms of others. 
Other than this, there is no independent privacy tort (i.e. a wrong caused by a failure 
to perform a civic duty to respect privacy) in UK law (I shall discuss the issues of 
privacy harms and remedies in section 3.3). Note for now that Article 8 has a number 
of  get-out  clauses  which  provide  grounds  for  transparency  activists  to  contest  a 
privacy ruling. Indeed, these clauses are a useful checklist for transparency activists – 
if  a  privacy-threatening  data  release  does  not  help  prevent  disorder  or  crime,  or 
protect rights and freedoms, or help national security or economic well-being, why go 
through with it? 
The other important instrument in this area is the Data Protection Act 1998, based on 
the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46. The Act, like all data protection legislation, is 
not specifically intended to protect privacy, but rather to balance the interests of the 
subjects  of  data  with  the  interests  of  data  users  (for  a  review  of  data  protection 
legislation, see Walden 2007). 
The Directive defines personal data as follows. 
(a)  ‗personal  data‘  shall  mean  any  information  relating  to  an  identified  or 
identifiable natural person (‗data subject‘); an identifiable person is one who 
can  be  identified,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  particular  by  reference  to  an UNCLASSIFIED 





identification  number  or  to  one  or  more  factors  specific  to  his  physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity. 
This appears to be clear, and indeed was clearer in the days when linking data across 
applications was difficult. The lack of ability to transfer data easily from host to host 
created a kind of practical obscurity that the Directive – already becoming out of date 
before it was published – trades on. This bygone nature of the Directive may be taken 
as somewhat worrying, given that, in the absence of a specific privacy tort in UK law, 
the  discourse  of  data  protection  is  ―assimilating  privacy  questions‖  and  so,  to  an 
extent at least, is being used by judges as a means of protecting privacy (Wacks 2006, 
173). 
1.2.3  Issues with data protection 
The  Data  Protection  Directive,  and  the  associated  Act  of  Parliament  which 
implements it, appear to be somewhat unloved by both privacy advocates and those 
who champion data-sharing as a means to efficiency and effectiveness. This might 
seem odd given the opposite pull of these two positions, but is explained by the lack 
of clarity of the Directive which renders much uncertain, particularly when considered 
in the light of the development of new technology and the evolution of social attitudes 
to technology that have taken place in the last twenty years. 
The form of an EU directive is that the substantive provisions are given in articles, 
which must be implemented by national governments within a reasonable timeframe. 
Interpretations  of  the  directive,  including  its  aims,  objectives  and  the  background 
context understood by its authors, are given in a series of recitals, which do not have 
to be implemented in national legislation. The Data Protection Directive has  been 
implemented unevenly across the EU, leading to many uncertainties (Korff 2003). 
To take an obvious and oft-criticised example, an identifiable person is defined as 
―one who can be identified‖. We can adopt the gloss of ‗identifiable‘ produced by the 
European Commission‘s advisory Article 29 Working Party here. 
In  general  terms,  a  natural  person  can  be  considered  as  ―identified‖  when, 
within a group of persons, he or she is ―distinguished‖ from all other members 
of the group. Accordingly, the natural person is ―identifiable‖ when, although 
the person has not been identified yet, it is possible to do it (that is the meaning 
of the suffix ―-able‖). … 
Identification  is  normally  achieved  through  particular  pieces  of  information 
which we may call ―identifiers‖ and which hold a particularly privileged and 
close relationship with the particular individual. Examples are outward signs of 
the  appearance  of  this  person,  like  height,  hair  colour,  clothing,  etc…  or  a 
quality of the person which cannot be immediately perceived, like a profession, 
a  function,  a  name  etc.  The  Directive  mentions  those  ―identifiers‖  in  the 
definition of ―personal data‖ in Article 2 [quoted above, section 1.2.2]. (Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party 2007, 12) 
This raises the natural question: ‗identifiable by whom?‘ An act implementing the 
Directive  could  be very strong if the  answer to this  question is  ‗by  anybody‘, or 
relatively weak if the answer is ‗by the data controller‘. 
The question of ‗identifiable by whom?‘ is discussed in the Directive‘s Recital 26. UNCLASSIFIED 





(26)  Whereas  the  principles  of  protection  must  apply  to  any  information 
concerning an identified or identifiable person; whereas, to determine whether a 
person  is  identifiable,  account  should  be  taken  of  all  the  means  likely 
reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify 
the said person; whereas the principles of protection shall not apply to data 
rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable 
… 
This is quite strong, suggesting that if anyone can identify someone from the data it is 
personal data. However, the upshot of this recital was not implemented in the Data 
Protection Act, which instead puts the onus on the controller: 
―personal  data‖  means  data  which  relate  to  a  living  individual  who  can  be 
identified— 
(a) from those data, or 
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is 
likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, 
and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication 
of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the 
individual; 
If  we  examine  Recital  26  further,  it  raises  more  questions.  All  means  ―likely 
reasonably to be used‖ – this is an extraordinarily vague phrase. As shall be discussed 
later, there are methods for deanonymising data that are very powerful, and although 
they are probably (at the time of writing) beyond the means of most individuals, their 
cost  is  balanced  by  the  potential  for  exploitation  of  a  large  quantity  of  data  in  a 
dataset. 
Similarly,  the  principles  of  protection  are  not  applied  to  anonymised  data  –  but 
anonymised  in  the  Recital  simply  means  that  ―the  data  subject  is  no  longer 
identifiable.‖  Once  more,  this  raises  the  question:  ‗identifiable  by  whom?‘ 
Recursively, one would imagine that the Recital intends the same wide interpretation 
of the question as it itself applied to the Directive, which means the same issues arise. 
In a world in which there are very powerful techniques for deanonymising data, is the 
upshot of the Recital that data sharing and transfer should virtually cease (as, for 
example, the legal scholar Paul Ohm has argued is a very reasonable interpretation of 
the Directive as a whole – Ohm 2010)? 
Furthermore, how effective do the means have to be to suggest that a person should be 
identifiable? Suppose I have a deanonymisation method that enables me to identify a 
person in a given dataset with a probability of 0.1% – I can identify one person in a 
thousand. Then any given person in the dataset is very unlikely to be identified by my 
method,  but  if  I  had  access  to  a  dataset  with  sensitive  information  about  25m 
individuals (such as the Child Benefit database lost by HMRC in 2007), then I could 
be  reasonably  sure  that  I  could  get  access  to  sensitive  information  about  25,000 
individuals  –  not a bad haul. For any individual person, it could  be said  that the 
chances of his being identified by these means are very small. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that many individuals are likely to be identified by the method. 
Of course, these and other interpretative questions have been thrashed out in various 
courts over the years, but grey areas remain both at the European level and at the level 
of national law (Korff 2003). The Directive is also being revised at the time of writing UNCLASSIFIED 





(http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/review/index_en.htm).  We  need  to  ask 
whether data can be linked to an actual person, at what cost, with what effort, for what 
purpose,  with  what  likelihood,  before  we  can  even  start  to  make  a  judgement. 
Answering these questions is non-trivial, and demands not only legal but economic 
and technical knowledge. 
1.2.4  Interpretation of the notion of ‘privacy’ in the context of the 
terms of reference of this review 
Clearly, the legal definition of data protection, and its relation to privacy, is extremely 
important in this space. It has come under criticism from privacy activists who believe 
that  its  protection  is  too  scanty,  from  data  users  who  believe  that  its  provisions 
undermine the fruitful exploitation of data for the public good, and technologists who 
believe that it is based on an outdated understanding of the technical capabilities of 
those who wish to undermine personal privacy. Some lawyers have argued that the 
legal  definition  is  incoherent  (Wacks  2006,  175-181).  Nonetheless,  it  should  go 
without  saying  that,  however  inadequate  the  law  is,  the  government  should  not 
wilfully break it. Furthermore, the law represents an attempt to codify social norms 
pertaining to privacy, and so has to be taken extremely seriously as a guide, if a 
flawed one, to what is acceptable and what not acceptable. 
Nevertheless, the most cursory of examinations of the terms of reference will show 
that the focus on data protection is not on its own adequate for this review. Firstly, the 
review is tasked with advising the government on practical approaches to ensuring 
that  ongoing  releases  of  data  can  continue  without  compromising  privacy.  That 
certainly entails that the government  does not break the law, but  also entails that 
public  confidence  in  the  transparency  programme  is  maintained.  If  there  was  a 
perceived problem with a data release that affected many thousands or millions of 
people, then, even if the government had adhered strictly to the letter of the law, the 
transparency programme would lose much of its political legitimacy. Equally, on the 
other side, worries about data protection could lead to unwarranted risk aversion about 
transparency, which will have its own chilling effect on the use and release of data in 
the public domain. 
Hence  this  review  must  also  take  into  account  public  perceptions  of  privacy  and 
private  life.  Although  legal  definitions  have  attempted  to  codify  these,  public 
perceptions change over time, and are rarely informed by the state of the law at any 
one  time.  Technological  innovation  is  a  particularly  speedy  driver  of  public 
perceptions – consider how behaviour on social networking sites has surprised many 
observers. The public is not a homogenous group of people, and its perceptions cannot 
simply be enumerated, but equally there has been important work both theoretical and 
survey-based on how the public views its privacy and invasions of that privacy, which 
this review will also take into account (cf. e.g. Bradwell 2010, Coles-Kemp et al 
2010). It should be said at the outset that there is evidence that the public is more 
relaxed  about  privacy,  particularly  as  a  value  to  be  traded  off  against  good  or 
improved  public  service,  than  experts  and  privacy  campaigners  often  realise  (cf. 
Kelsey 2009, Bradwell 2010). 
So, to take one example of how one should reason in this space, some transparency 
activists argue, with logic, that if data could be released reactively under the terms of 
the Freedom  of  Information  Act  (FoIA), then they  should be  released  proactively 
under a transparency programme, as  there  can  be no legal impediment.  This  is  a UNCLASSIFIED 





pleasingly elegant formulation – yet one that I believe should be resisted, because 
public perceptions of privacy may not be exactly expressed by FoIA. The activists‘ 
principle  could  result  in  a  perfectly  legal  release  of  data  that  causes  a  loss  of 
confidence in transparency. 
The second reason to expand the inquiry beyond data protection is that the terms of 
reference specifically mention the risks of jigsaw identification. This is a technical 
concept  describing  the  ability  or  otherwise  of  an  adversary  to  reidentify  or  to 
deanonymise  anonymised  data,  with  the  help  of  background  information  and 
processing  power  (see  section  4  for  detailed  discussion  of  this).  Because  of  the 
technical  element  of  this  practice,  it  is  also  essential  for  this  review  to  take  into 
account technical definitions and concepts of privacy from mathematics and computer 
science. 
Hence, the review will not focus directly on the legal definition of privacy, but instead 
will try to broker between the legal definition, the technical definition and public 
perceptions.  The  success  of  the  transparency  programme  will  depend  on  the 
government not breaking the law and on not losing the trust of the citizen, and to do 
that it will need, among other things, to avoid releasing information in a form which 
could lead to widespread compromises of privacy by adversaries even if the releases 
were legal and the possibility of compromise was initially unanticipated or discounted 
by the public. Hence all three paradigms – the legal, the public perception and the 
technical – are essential. 
1.2.5  Interpretation of the notion of ‘transparency’ 
‗Transparency‘  covers  a  number  of  different  styles  of  data  release,  including:  the 
sharing of possibly sensitive personal data for disinterested research; the sale of data 
to companies or other bodies; the mandatory publication of data on certain matters 
(e.g.  company  accounts,  or  energy  levels  of  electrical  goods);  and  a  Freedom  of 
Information regime within government. These are not the focus of this review. 
Its focus is the release of datasets not to individuals, but to everyone, in reusable form, 
with  few  restrictions  of  use  (e.g.  under  the  Open  Government  Licence),  via  an 
accessible  infrastructure  (such  as  the  World  Wide  Web),  under  the  administrative 
infrastructure described in section 1.1. 
Some of the conclusions of this review could be different if dealing with different 
ideas  of  transparency.  The  review  applies  only  to  the  type  of  unconditional 
transparency sketched in the previous paragraph. 
1.2.6  Privacy, the individual and the corporation 
Given this line of thought, an immediate issue presents itself with respect to corporate 
bodies. Of course, corporate bodies have deep and important issues with respect to 
transparency  –  for  example  confidentiality,  copyright  and  intellectual  property. 
Nevertheless, I do not believe that these issues are best dealt with under the rubric of 
‗privacy‘, however analogous they may be. They have legal bases and, unlike the 
privacy of individuals, are best dealt with using legal procedures and reasoning. 
To take one example, there are currently in place guidelines concerning redactions 
from contracts to be published online based upon principles previously developed in 
the context of FoIA. The guidelines covering the publication of central government 
contracts, for instance, state: UNCLASSIFIED 





Certain  redactions  may  be  required  prior  to  publication  in  order  to  protect 
certain types of information which may be considered exempt from publication. 
Redactions of contractual text are permitted in line with the exemptions set out 
by the Freedom of Information Act. This is also the approach being taken for 
the requirement to publish items of central government spending over £25,000. 
The Freedom of Information Act contains 23 grounds for possible exemptions. 
For example, these exemptions may include information in relation to national 
security,  commercial  confidentiality  and  the  protection  of  personal  data  as 
permitted by the Freedom of Information Act. (Cabinet Office 2011a, 9) 
Also see (Cabinet Office 2011b). 
The  use  of  a  legal  framework  already  informed  by  FoIA  is  a  logical  step.  If 
information or data held by a corporation can be freed under the terms of FoIA, then it 
seems reasonable to say that it should be freed under the transparency programme, in 
the  corporate  context  where  public  confidence  in  transparency  is  unlikely  to  be 
threatened. 
Nevertheless, the procedures and recommendations I shall set out in section 5.3 could 
be adapted to the corporate case if this was felt necessary. 
1.3  Approach of this review 
Given the above interpretation of the terms of reference, in this section I shall sketch 
the approach that I have taken, particularly focusing on the properties of the solutions 
I shall be putting forward. 
1.3.1  Broad principles 
The  transparency  regime  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  a  new  phenomenon  whose 
institutions are evolving extremely quickly (section 1.1). The Transparency Board and 
the Transparency Team of the Cabinet Office have no statutory powers to release 
data; neither do other agencies, such as the Home Office, for example, which had to 
work  in  partnership  with  police  forces  and  other  agencies  to  deliver  the  Prime 
Minister‘s commitment that the citizen should be able to see the level of crime in his 
or her street by early 2011. Hence the transparency programme has been until now 
realised by an ad hoc combination of exhortation, pressure, expenditure of political 
capital, cajoling and reasoned debate. 
It follows that it would not be sensible to prescribe a particular set of institutions and 
relationships,  be  they  ever  so  brilliantly  devised.  This  review  will  instead  try  to 
describe the debates and arguments that should take place, together with the evidence 
that should be amassed, that will enable policymakers to determine the extent of risk 
associated with a particular proposal to release data in one or another form. 
As  a  result,  in  its  fourteen  recommendations  this  review  will  set  out  the  broad 
principles of an approach to the consideration of the privacy issues in this space, 
rather than detailed specifications of institutions or procedures. 
1.3.2  Case-by-case reasoning 
Furthermore, it is clear that the transparency programme is blazing a trail in a number 
of innovative ways, changing our political assumptions. The attitude to transparency 
of the public, of politicians, of the media and of public servants is likely to evolve UNCLASSIFIED 





unpredictably over the next few years. There will be unintended and unanticipated 
consequences. 
Hence  setting  out  strict  principles,  or  an  exact  institutional  structure,  would  be 
counterproductive in another way – any set of ideas to deal with the privacy issues 
that transparency will create will need to adapt to new circumstances, new demands 
and changing attitudes. What is possible now may not be possible in 2015, and vice 
versa. 
There is divergence across the various areas of policy – health, transport, education, 
criminal justice, etc. Any particular release of data will have its own set of properties 
and constraints that could vary along any or all of the following dimensions: 
  Public expectations. 
  Legal barriers to the release of data. 
  The  availability  and  richness  of  background  information  that  would  be 
valuable to a person who wished to deanonymise personal data. 
  The sensitivity of the public to privacy breaches (which itself often differs 
between the generations, between the sexes or between people of different 
educational attainments). 
  The nature of the potential harms. 
  The value to the public of a data release. 
Hence it is important, if possible, to treat each dataset to be released as having unique 
characteristics based on its specific context, and deal with the privacy issues on a 
case-by-case basis. In this review, the broad principles and procedures I shall set out 
will facilitate case-by-case treatment without placing too heavy a bureaucratic burden 
on the transparency programme. 
1.3.3  Balance 
‗Balance‘ is an important concept here. As I have argued elsewhere (O‘Hara 2010), it 
is incorrect to assume that privacy is of value primarily to the individual, while the 
interests of society are served by eroding privacy. Privacy is a public good, essential 
for the successful functioning of a democratic society (Rössler 2005, Solove 2008, 
Raab forthcoming), and so the balance between privacy and transparency (which is 
another public good) cannot simply be expressed as a balance between the interests of 
the individual and those of the community. 
To say this is to assume there is a linear interpretation, a zero-sum game in which a 
successful data release will of necessity invade privacy, and a successful defence of 
privacy will of necessity prevent data being used effectively for public benefit. These 
propositions are false: on many occasions privacy and transparency will push in the 
same direction. 
To  take  one  obvious  type  of  example,  the  success  of  a  transparency  programme 
depends on public trust, which is more likely to be preserved if the public feels that 
those in charge of the programme respect its privacy concerns. In a second type of 
example,  a  transparency  programme  will  be  able  to  furnish  a  full  and  officially-
sanctioned record of events, which by stating the full facts, avoiding both partiality 
and  sensationalism,  will  reduce  the  incentives  to  spread  misleading  and UNCLASSIFIED 





decontextualized accounts which could be far more damaging even if true. Consider 
the  publication  of  accurate  court  data:  that  could  surely  help  by  setting  out  the 
complete  official  record,  recording  the  ‗not  guilty‘  verdicts  alongside  arrests,  and 
successful appeals alongside convictions. Other media, reflected in search engines, 
may instead concentrate on the sensational, to create a true but misleading narrative. 
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that privacy is only one of several kinds of public 
good,  which may  well  on occasion  clash. When such  circumstances  do arise,  the 
language of balance tends to skew the debate, particularly as privacy is often cast as 
primarily an interest of the individual and a cost to the community. In one of the 
earliest uses of the word in Troilus and Cressida, Achilles, sulking in his tent, growls 
―Of this my privacy/I have strong reasons.‖ The wily Ulysses replies ―But ‘gainst 
your  privacy/the  reasons  are  more  potent  and heroical.‖  Shakespeare  seems  to  be 
hinting that the public duties of Achilles should outweigh his private motivation. 
The problem then arises that the interests of the individual can hardly be expected to 
be treated with equal weight to the interests of the entire community (an asymmetry 
that has worried a number of commentators, such as Raab 1999). So embattled is the 
right to privacy that balance will always be extremely difficult to achieve. 
To resolve the issue we should note that ‗balance‘ is both a noun and a verb. It can 
denote a state wherein goods are distributed equally and justly. However, such a state 
is unlikely to be easily achieved in this area. Given a potential data release, a decision 
must be made as to whether the release goes ahead or not; there is no balance between 
release or retention. 
A  more  useful  interpretation  is  of  ‗balance‘  as  a  verb  denoting  a  process  of 
comparison and just treatment of competing goods and interests. In particular, the 
status of privacy as a basic human right means that any such process must ensure that 
privacy is preserved. This interpretation brings other more useful notions into play, 
including proportionality, necessity and the public good. In a practical situation, this 
interpretation would introduce such questions as, for example, whether it would be 
possible to achieve the same or comparable effects without a release of potentially 
identifying data. 
Hence  this  review  will  treat  its  balance  requirement  as  follows:  to  determine  the 
maximum  level  of  transparency  consistent  with  an  acceptable  level  of  privacy  in 
British democracy. 
1.3.4  Data and information 
One more important terminological clarification concerns the well-known distinction 
between information and data. This distinction is more often gestured towards than 
defined rigorously, but broadly speaking data are at a lower level of abstraction than 
information.  Information is  data interpreted for  some audience in  some way, data 
presented in order to maximise their utility in a context. Data themselves might be a 
set of numerical values of some parameters, or (in the world of linked data) a set of 
triples  in  the  Resource  Description  Framework  (RDF).  The  crime  data  released 
monthly  are  data,  while  the  maps  and  functionality  of  the  police.uk  website  are 
information. 
A government could be transparent with respect to information or to data. Given the 
interests and activities of the Transparency Board and the Transparency Team of the 
Cabinet Office who have commissioned this review, and given the focus in the terms UNCLASSIFIED 





of reference on data, I shall concentrate on data transparency – the release of datasets 
which  can  be  turned  into  information  (i.e.  applied  to  a  task)  by  anyone  who 
downloads the data from data.gov.uk or some other outlet – rather than information 
transparency in this review. Many of the arguments are perfectly general over all 
levels of transparency, but if there is a doubt, the context is data transparency. 
I shall restrict my comments to transparency with respect to data generated by or on 
behalf of public sector organisations. I shall call them ‗government data‘ and ‗public 
data‘ interchangeably. I do not consider the possibility of private sector organisations, 
whether companies or non-profit organisations, being transparent in this sense except 
where they are providing services for government, competing for government tenders 
and so on. 
1.3.5  The review will not recommend new legal or technological 
instruments 
The aim of this review will therefore be to suggest processes and institutions that will 
be flexible enough to respond to new threats, fluctuations in public confidence and 
changing  attitudes  and  mores.  It  will  not  recommend  new  legal  or  technological 
instruments, for reasons detailed in this section. 
A  feature  of  this  area  is  the  speed  with  which  privacy-threatening  technical 
developments occur, and the relative tardiness of responses to these. As noted above 
(section 1.2.4), it is unhelpful to view this issue as primarily a legal issue demanding a 
legal response, and as implied in the same section, neither is this just a technical issue 
requiring some kind of cleverer widget or protocol to sort things out. 
In the legal case, a new instrument (say, for instance, a replacement for the EU‘s Data 
Protection Directive 95/46) would simply take too long to craft, given the speed of 
technical  development.  One  serious  problem  with  95/46  is  that  its  intellectual 
background was the world of the 1980s in which the digital threat to privacy was 
posed by the proliferation of standalone databases within government and industry; its 
laudable aim was to facilitate ethical data-sharing across the national borders of EU 
member states to extract value from those databases in the internal market without 
compromising  privacy.  However,  many  commentators  have  argued  that  it  is 
completely  inadequate  for  a  networked  world.  Indeed,  the  problems  of  the  EU 
lawmaking process in the context of the regulation of technology are rather nakedly 
illustrated by 95/46, which came into force at pretty well the exact moment that the 
World  Wide  Web,  whose  existence  is  not  mentioned  in  the  directive,  became  an 
important social and economic tool beyond the purely academic sector. The problem 
with legal instruments is that by the time they appear, the threat they are intended to 
encounter is likely to have evolved. 
I  note  once  more  that  the  Directive  is  currently  under  revision,  having  been 
supplemented  already  by  Directive  2002/58/EC  on  privacy  and  electronic 
communications. The Commission has attempted to move quickly to produce a timely 
revision, but – illustrating the difficulties here – pressure on the Commission from the 
French Commission Nationale de l‘Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) and other 
bodies has already forced a delay in the schedule (Williams 2010). 
Technical  responses  (i.e.  software,  protocols  and  tools  to  protect  privacy)  tend  to 
become  available  more  quickly  (and  their  developers  have  a  greater  technical 
understanding of the threats), but are problematic in their own right. In the first place, UNCLASSIFIED 





there is still a time lag between the emergence of the threat and the development of 
tools to counter it. Secondly, privacy-enhancing technologies tend to be hard to use 
(Sasse  &  Flechais  2005),  often  relying  on  the  individual  to  deploy  an  unrealistic 
degree of understanding of the issues (e.g. requiring the individual to state his or her 
privacy  preferences  precisely  in  some  technical  language).  Thirdly,  technologists‘ 
models of behaviour are often wildly inaccurate, failing to factor in mistakes, short 
cuts, ingenuity, laziness, creativity and lack of engagement. The degree of vigilance 
that purely technical solutions demand often places an unrealistically large overhead 
of responsibility on the individual. Fourthly, technological fixes or patches tend to 
deal with more specific types of attack than do the legal solutions. Consequently, 
patches can introduce further vulnerabilities, and in any case it is part of the natural 
threat/response cycle that hackers will immediately begin work to undermine the new 
solutions. 
1.4  Structure of this report 
To investigate this question, the report will be divided into three major sections. In the 
next section, I shall discuss the theory of transparency. In section 3 I shall discuss 
privacy  in  the  context  of  transparency,  focusing  particularly  on  how  privacy  and 
transparency  can be complementary rather than antagonistic, and considering how 
trust  in  the  transparency  programme  can  be  created  and  maintained.  These  two 
sections  will  provide  essential  background  to  the  specific  topic  of  the  technical 
question of how privacy can be compromised by applying computing techniques to 
digital datasets (section 4), and how traditional models of data management can no 
longer be accepted uncritically. Section 5, the final substantive section of the report, 
makes recommendations about how to address the difficulties that have been outlined. UNCLASSIFIED 





2  Transparency 
This section will set out the theory of transparency, beginning with a description of 
the philosophy behind it (section 2.1), and moving on to consider the nature of any 
potential threat to privacy from either theory or practice (section 2.2) 
2.1  The theory of transparency 
The appeal of transparency, which grew out of the success of right-to-know measures 
and limited, targeted transparency programmes such as that which forced corporations 
to publish their accounts for investors, can be summarised in the famous quote from 
Louis Brandeis of the US Supreme Court: ―sunlight is the best disinfectant.‖ In a 
pleasing symmetry, Brandeis was also a pioneer in the development of privacy rights. 
In this section I shall set out the philosophy of transparency in more detail. 
2.1.1  The philosophy of transparency 
The basis of the philosophy of transparency is very simply stated: the government has 
collected data or information for whatever reason, using the resources and legitimacy 
it derives from its citizens, and therefore, unless harm could result from the public 
release of that data, there would seem to be little reason against releasing it to its 
citizens to make productive use of. One of the potential harms is of course the danger 
that the privacy of some citizens is compromised. 
According to the transparency philosophy, government information and data should 
be  freely  available.  Having  been  collected  using  public  money,  it  should,  where 
possible, be open for reuse in order to create further economic value. Government 
open data should be available to all to avoid monopoly exploitation or rent-seeking by 
a cabal of data controllers. The barriers to entry should be as low as possible, while 
publication  should  be  inexpensive  and  straightforward,  with  as  few  bureaucratic 
overheads and layers of management as possible. Speed and timeliness are important. 
Regulations  demanding  bureaucratic  oversight  will  provide  an  opportunity  for  the 
process to be obstructed, or ‗kicked into the long grass‘. 
This means that a transparency programme should ideally eschew common regulatory 
mechanisms such as putting the data behind an Application Programming Interface 
(API), a set of rules that other computer programs must follow in order to access the 
data. APIs can be used to protect data, for example to operate a regime where only 
licensed developers or subscribers are allowed access. Such control over the released 
data could be of value in protecting privacy for reasons that will be explored below, 
but the processes of control would demand too much bureaucracy, and be off-putting 
for potential users. 
Transparency is underpinned by a mixture of arguments from the left, right and centre 
of political philosophy, which goes some way to explain its wide appeal. From John 
Stuart Mill it takes the idea that the serendipitous reuse of data is valuable, because 
―the utmost possible publicity and liberty of discussion‖ is an important condition for 
improving  our  understanding  of  the  world  via  critical  debate,  and  ―the  widest 
participation  in  the  details  of  judicial  and  administrative  business‖  will  only  be 
effective if the discussants are well-informed (Mill 1861, chapter 6; see also Mill 
1859, part II). From Hayek, it takes the idea that knowledge about an economy or 
society is distributed across its population, and that therefore individuals are best-
placed  to  judge  their  own  information  and  data  needs  (Hayek  1945).  And  from UNCLASSIFIED 





egalitarian socialist philosophy it takes the idea that asymmetries of information lead 
to asymmetries of power, and should therefore be eliminated, a line of thought dating 
back to Diderot (cf. Diderot [1755]1995). 
In this review, I shall take this composite philosophy of transparency as a given. It is 
certainly  defensible  and  appeals  across  the  political  spectrum.  I  shall  attempt  to 
develop ideas for protecting privacy within its context. Were this to prove impossible, 
given  the  importance  of  privacy  as  a  value  and  a  right  there  would  be  serious 
consequences for transparency. 
Transparency is now feasible and valuable in a way that it would not have been a few 
years  ago.  Not  only  have  public  attitudes  toward  authority  altered,  but  crucially 
technologies  are  now  in  place  which  make  it  straightforward  to  disseminate  data 
widely, and for that data to be reused in new, innovative contexts. Of all the digital 
technologies that are relevant, the World Wide Web is the most obvious. 
Note, however, that the use of the Web subtly alters the justification for transparency. 
If data are to be released on the Web to the citizens of a nation, then – if the openness 
criterion is to remain – there is no way to restrict its publication to those citizens. The 
data  become  available  to  everyone,  whether  or  not  their  taxes  paid  for  data 
acquisition. Diderot, whose Encyclopédie had an impeccable internationalist outlook, 
would have approved. 
2.1.2  Data literacy, representation and intermediaries 
To be properly informative, data must be usable. Yet government data, sometimes 
presented  in  complex,  technical  or  unfamiliar  formats,  are  difficult  to  understand, 
boring to look through and hard to manipulate. Without basic levels of data literacy, 
how can transparency be empowering? 
This question is often raised – see, for example, the flurry of sceptical newspaper 
comment that accompanied the first monthly release of crime data in February 2011 
(e.g. White 2011). Data literacy is indeed an issue, and is generally, like all kinds of 
literacy, a good thing to be encouraged (cf. e.g. Beetham et al 2009, which talks of 
digital literacy, or McAuley et al 2011). It would certainly make transparency more 
likely to empower people. 
Yet in a world where data literacy is in somewhat short supply, transparency can still 
make a difference via the intercession of intermediaries, information entrepreneurs 
and applications developers who amalgamate data from different sources to present a 
picture of some state of affairs in real time, possibly via websites or smart phone apps 
for. Fung and colleagues go further and argue that citizens will underconsume data 
unless  such intermediaries  re-present  it (Fung et  al  2007, 121). The  role of these 
intermediaries  is  to  present  the  data  in  comprehensible  form,  and  devise  services 
around them. These services may be provided free of charge, but some intermediaries 
will find methods to monetise them, perhaps via advertising, or a subscription model. 
It may be that intermediaries are able to contribute, via their services, to the growth of 
data literacy (which may lead to their being able to access education funding). 
An obvious point is that these intermediaries are in a position of some power, because 
they do not present the data neutrally; they have an editorial slant which they will 
naturally  seek  to  promote.  This  is  of  course  true,  but  while  it  may  be  a  useful 
corrective to naïve optimism about a sector of public-spirited hackers, it does not hold 
water as a serious objection. In the current situation, news about the world is filtered UNCLASSIFIED 





through  a  smallish  number  of  media  outfits,  whose  power  is  proportional  to  the 
barriers to entry to the intermediary role. Transparency lowers those barriers to entry, 
and allows many more entrants into the field of data provision. Honesty and good 
faith  cannot  be  guaranteed,  but  transparency  at  least  provides  the  opportunity  for 
alternative views to be heard. 
Digital divides and unequal access to data are also important concerns, but once more 
it  is  hard  to  see  how  one  could  address  this  without  open  data  re-presented  by 
intermediaries except by the draconian and counterproductive strategy of starving the 
data  literate  of  data.  Even  if  one  remained  stubbornly  pessimistic  about  the 
capabilities  and  intentions  of  intermediaries,  it  is  surely  impossible  to  argue  that 
transparency makes anything worse by increasing competition in the data market. 
If there is a lack of data literacy in a society, it does not invalidate a transparency 
programme.  Instead  it  underlines  the  importance  of  a  competitive  set  of  creative 
intermediaries. 
2.1.3  Government as an intermediary 
There is no reason why government should not also position itself as an intermediary 
in  some cases,  although this  cannot  be the only  solution  to  the problem.  Even if 
government does adopt this role, it is essential that the data are released, so that other 
intermediaries can use them as they see fit. 
How, and why, might the government set up as an intermediary? As an example, 
consider the release of crime data. The data are being released on a rolling basis, but 
the Home Office also set up a site, police.uk, to present them to the public. This site 
has two entirely laudable functions. The first is to help create a constituency for the 
crime data, a group of people interested in what they tell us. Rather than release the 
data and wait, possibly for months, for intermediaries to emerge and present the data 
imaginatively, the Home Office‘s sensible strategy was to launch a crime mapping 
site,  with  associated  publicity,  to  increase  awareness.  The  second  function  of 
police.uk is to provide an interface between the citizen and the police, for example 
informing people of who their beat officers are, and when meetings between police 
and the community are scheduled, thereby equipping the citizen to play a more active 
role in the policing of his or her own neighbourhood. 
So much is good practice. Yet there are two potential pitfalls to this approach. The 
first  is  that the government, with  its extensive resources,  could squeeze  out  other 
intermediaries, resulting in a less rather than more varied information market. 
The second is that intermediaries focus on the representation of the data, not the data 
themselves. Hence the government might find itself, as both a data provider and a data 
intermediary, looking at the data in incompatible ways. For example, in the UK there 
has been a perception that it will be problematic to bring data about crime (which are 
currently available) together with data from the courts, despite the immense public 
interest in knowing how crimes were dealt with by the criminal justice system. Of 
course it would be problematic to do that on a map updated monthly, because of 
various  issues  to  do  with  the  time  lags  between  criminal  activity  and  court 
proceedings.  But  that is an issue with  the specific representation  type  –  the map. 
There is no reason why some creative intermediary could not find some other way of 
amalgamating crime and court data (possibly with other types of data) to produce an 
imaginative  presentation  of  the  unified  datasets  to  the  public.  The  undoubted UNCLASSIFIED 





difficulties  of  representation  can  be  taken,  falsely,  to  imply  difficulties  in  data 
provision. 
Hence government is unlikely to be a satisfactory intermediary beyond the short term, 
but  does  have  a  role  in  helping  boost  awareness  and  data  literacy.  Independent 
intermediaries are likely to be much more creative and aware of demand in their use 
of data. Furthermore, their demand-awareness will also help set the agenda in the 
selection  of  datasets  to  release,  and  will  allow  them  to  work  in  partnership  with 
government to ensure data quality and reliability. 
2.1.4  Two transparency agendas 
The transparency philosophy contains two separate and independent agendas which I 
call the accountability agenda, and the information agenda. 
  Under the accountability agenda, the aim is to move away from traditional 
models  of  accountability  of  public  services.  Currently,  the  accountability 
mechanisms used for public services are internal to government and/or formal 
(to  use  the  terminology  of  Gilbert  1959),  using  resources  and  processes 
generated  by  government  itself  (chiefly  oversight  by  civil  servants,  often 
driven by targets, ultimately grounded in the accountability of ministers to 
Parliament). The aim is to move toward informal, external oversight (Gilbert 
1959) with direct intervention and participation by citizens, interest groups and 
the  media.  The  accountability  agenda  therefore  requires  sufficient  relevant 
data to be provided to allow considered judgement about the performance of 
public servants, and especially to allow comparisons to be made over time or 
between agencies. 
  Under the information agenda, the aim is to allow the citizen to develop a rich 
picture  of  his  or  her  community,  empowering  him  or  her  by  enabling  the 
negotiation and management of community and environment. Under this idea, 
the government supplies data that it possesses or has collected which could be 
of value to the citizen, but because the citizen decides what is of value and 
how, government cannot predict with any accuracy which data that it holds is 
of most interest. 
These two agendas work together in driving change, giving incentives for government 
agencies  and  service  providers  to  move  from  being  bureaucratic  organisations,  to 
post-bureaucratic  organisations.  This  distinction  between  bureaucratic  and  post-
bureaucratic has been bandied about frequently in recent British politics, and some 
commentators have become suspicious of the jargon. Nevertheless, the distinction has 
been made with due precision; for definitions of the terms, and the characteristics of 
these types of organisation, see (Kernaghan 2000). 
The accountability and information agendas are not equivalent, and may sometimes 
be in tension. The differences between them are summarised in the following table. 
Accountability agenda  Information agenda 
Can be driven from the top down. 
Expertise  is  helpful  for 
determining  which  data  are 
valuable  for  holding  government 
agencies  to  account  for  the 
Better driven from the bottom up, as the citizen 
has  a  much  better  idea  of  which  data  are  of 
value to him or her, than the government can 
have in the abstract. UNCLASSIFIED 





Accountability agenda  Information agenda 
functions which they are designed 
to carry out. 
Supply-focused.  Demand-focused. 
The data need to be specific only in 
so far as they allow the important 
comparisons to be made. 
The more specific (less aggregated) the data the 
better.  Citizens  need  data  about  their  local 
community,  and  all  things  being  equal  will 
benefit from seeing those patterns visible at a 
low  level  (street  level,  neighbourhood  level, 
ward level), rather than the patterns that emerge 
at higher levels (county level, city level). 
Assumes  a  purpose  (holding 
government  agencies  to  account) 
for the data.  
The released data have no purpose as such. I.e. 
although  they  may  have  been  collected  by 
government  for  a  purpose,  there  is  no 
assumption that the data will be reused by the 
public for this or any other purpose. 
Hence  it  makes  sense,  in  this 
context,  to  talk  about  unintended 
consequences of a data release (e.g. 
a government agency might be able 
to game the system). 
The intended consequence is that the citizen be 
empowered  in  some  way.  Hence  the  only 
possible unintended consequence would be that 
the  data  release  disempowered  the  citizen 
(possibly by invading privacy). 
The data are likely to be useful in 
isolation (which is not to say they 
will not have uses when linked to 
other data). 
The  data  will  become  much  more  useful  and 
powerful when linked to other datasets. 
It follows from the above that there 
are fewer imperatives to represent 
the data in formats that maximise 
linkability (e.g. RDF). 
It follows from the above that there are stronger 
imperatives  to  release  the  data  in  linkable 
formats. 
Failure of the public to use the data 
will be disappointing. 
Failure of the public to use the data will not be a 
problem.  They  have  a  right  to  the  data, 
including  datasets  that  remain  unused  (in  the 
same way that an unused right of way is, and 
should remain, a right of way). 
Based  on  a  right  to  hold 
government to account. 
Based on a right of access to the data. 
Intended  to  critique  government 
services,  and  improve  service 
delivery and efficiency. 
Intended to increase the citizen‘s independence 
of government. 
To  be  effective,  there  need  to  be 
routes  and  methods  in  place  to 
allow  the  citizen  to  make  a 
difference to the institutions being 
held to account. 
To be effective, services need to be developed 
around the data. UNCLASSIFIED 





Tension between the two agendas arises in particular with the types of data selected 
for release, the methods of selection and the levels of aggregation. For instance, data 
about  crime  are  most  helpful  to  the  accountability  agenda  when  aggregated  to  a 
certain degree, so that patterns at the level of a police force‘s territory are visible, 
whereas they may be most helpful to the information agenda when disaggregated, so 
that  one  can  see  specific  crime  hotspots,  for  instance  down  to  a  particular  street 
corner. Release of data in the form appropriate for one agenda may make it hard to 
infer the data in alternative forms, and hence there is a tension. 
In most cases, the two agendas co-exist perfectly peacefully. For instance, again using 
the example of crime, it may be that accountability is best served by releases of data 
about serious crime, while the information agenda provides a stronger demand for 
data about anti-social behaviour. There is no tension here, because of course both 
types of data can be released in parallel. 
2.1.5  What transparency is not 
In recent years, there have been incidents of the unscheduled releases of data which 
have  provoked  substantial  public  debate.  It  is  important  to  make  clear  how  these 
incidents  differ from  the transparency programme  –  and therefore are beyond the 
scope of this review. Such events do sometimes have privacy impacts, but these will 
not be remedied or otherwise addressed by the recommendations below. Examples 
include: 
1.  In 2007, two CDs belonging to Her Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs with only 
weak  password  protection,  containing  sensitive  details  of  child  benefit 
claimants in the United Kingdom, went missing from the internal mail service. 
Around this time, a series of unintended releases of data, through carelessness 
and poor organisational management of information, occurred in the British 
government  and  in  the  private  sector.  Almost  certainly,  similar  incidents 
continue  to  happen  even  though  the  media  spotlight  has  been  trained 
elsewhere. 
2.  In  2009,  in  response  to  a  Freedom  of  Information  request,  the  House  of 
Commons authorities prepared to release redacted records pertaining to the 
expenses  claims  of  MPs  over  a  period  of  years.  Before  the  records  were 
released, however, the  Daily Telegraph published unredacted copies of the 
same records which received massive publicity and created an unprecedented 
scandal. 
3.  In  2010,  the  document  archive  website  Wikileaks  published  confidential 
documents  relating  to  the  conflicts  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  and  detailed 
correspondence  between  the  US  State  Department  and  various  of  its 
diplomatic missions. 
None of these cases is an instance of transparency. In the first case the data were not 
released openly or published. If the data are still available to anyone, they will be 
available only to a small number of people, who either found or stole the original 
CDs, or who have purchased their contents from the possessor. 
In the first and third cases, the data release was not planned, and was partial. The total 
set of potential data users (i.e. the general public) was not alerted to the forthcoming 
release, which was therefore not a transparent process. Furthermore, there was no 
guarantee that the data released was a comprehensive collection of the relevant data. UNCLASSIFIED 





The data may have contained gaps, and therefore may present a slanted or biased 
view. 
In the second case, the Telegraph information was not released according to a well-
understood schedule and methodology. The information released in accordance with 
the  original  FoI  request  was  so  released,  but  the  leaks  from  the  Telegraph  were 
intended  to  drive  a  news  agenda,  were  released  in  staggered  fashion,  were 
accompanied with sensational commentary and also disregarded the data subjects‘ 
(MPs‘) prior understanding of how the process should work. That does not entail that 
the official, much-delayed release of the data under FoI was  a perfect  method of 
publication,  and  that  the  redactions  were  justified;  the  argument  is  only  that  the 
Telegraph‘s  leak  was  not  in  itself  part  of  a  meaningful,  agreed,  accountable  and 
legitimate transparency process. 
In none of the cases was the release of information itself a transparent process. The 
distribution  of  data  was  restricted  in  the  first  case,  selection  of  information  was 
random in two of the cases, while in the case of MPs‘ expenses there was no due 
process. 
2.1.6  The forms of resistance 
The  British  government  has  traditionally  been  somewhat  retentive  of  data  and 
information. Tony Blair, whose government introduced the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000, famously berated himself in his memoirs as a ―naïve, foolish, irresponsible 
nincompoop‖ and ―quake[d] at the imbecility of it.‖  The Minister for the Cabinet 
Office  has  argued that  transparency  will require a ―radical culture  change for the 
public sector‖ (Maude 2010). 
Parts of government which do oppose the transparency programme will be apt to use 
not only direct arguments to stop the process, but also indirect ones about the qualities 
of the data in order to slow down releases. There are a number of such arguments that 
can be marshalled here, including the need for accuracy (so that the public is not 
misled by inaccurate data), and the supposed costs of the process. Privacy is one of 
these useful arguments; raising privacy concerns can prevent data releases even if the 
risks are small or easily mitigated by aggregation or other means. Hence an apparent 
concern for privacy on the part of a data provider may or may not reflect a genuine 
underlying  concern.  The  Information  Commissioner‘s  Office  (ICO)  urges 
organisations not to hide behind the Data Protection Act unnecessarily when dealing 
with  requests  from  members  of  the  public  (cf. 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/news/current_topics/duck_out.aspx).  Though  this  certainly 
does  not  entitle  those  implementing  a  transparency  programme  to  brush  privacy 
concerns away (cf. ICO 2011), it complicates the issue in a retentive culture where 
transparency is alien. 
2.2  Is there a threat to privacy from transparency? 
How might transparency affect privacy? In this section I shall briefly look at this 
question, at first from the viewpoint of the philosophy of transparency, and secondly 
from the perspective of the actual implementation of the UK government. UNCLASSIFIED 





2.2.1  The prima facie threat to privacy 
There is of course a prima facie issue with respect to privacy in any transparency 
programme. A transparent government must release data, by definition. What if the 
data concern me? If data, of which I am the subject, are released onto the Web, where 
is my privacy then? 
It  is  worth  noting  first  of  all  that  the  privacy  which  is  supposedly  at  risk  from 
transparency is a somewhat odd brand. The data about which people are concerned 
are held by government, and are not in possession of the data subject. The subject has 
little control over how the use of the data. To feel private, the subject must trust the 
government to prevent access by others, follow best practice in both data protection 
and data acquisition. As Raab (2005, 285) pointed out, ―it is no comfort to a privacy-
aware individual to be told that inaccurate, outdated, excessive and irrelevant data 
about her are encrypted and stored behind hacker-proof firewalls.‖ Privacy here is 
akin to trust in government. 
Nevertheless, there is an obvious point that transparency does impact the individual at 
the  point  where  he  or  she  interacts  with  the  government.  If  citizens  are  to  judge 
whether, say, a particular school is underperforming, then they will need to know the 
examination results of the children in that school; to judge their police force they will 
need data about crime and from the courts. Of course these can be anonymised or 
aggregated  into  statistics,  but  the  main  point  is  that  knowing  about  government 
necessarily involves knowing about society. 
Even if the data are aggregated, so that individuals do not obviously appear in them, 
there may be worries that a picture of one‘s life could be reassembled by someone 
with sufficient information, resources and patience. As we shall see in section 4, this 
suspicion is not unfounded. Indeed, even when one does not appear in a dataset at all, 
one can still have aspects of one‘s life exposed in an unwelcome way. 
As an example of this somewhat counterintuitive notion, consider an extraordinary 
case in Germany, a nation which is generally more conscious of privacy than Britain. 
After some controversy, Google Street View, a service which provides panoramic 
views  of  locations  across  the  world,  went  live  in  Germany  despite  concerns  that 
people‘s  houses  would  be  clearly  visible.  After  some  pressure  from  the  German 
government, Google agreed to a compromise, that people would be allowed to ‗opt 
out‘ of the service by contacting Google, upon which images of their property would 
be blurred out. 
So far so good. However, in Essen, transparency activists have been attacking and 
vandalising the homes of those who have opted out, throwing eggs and writing graffiti 
(‗Google is cool‘) on the blurred-out houses. This behaviour is not endorsed in any 
way by Google (BBC Online 2010). 
The interesting point is that the compromise was meant to be privacy-preserving, but 
in this case the activists wished to identify only the (whereabouts of the) houses of 
those who opposed the aims of Google Street View – an identification which could be 
achieved  from  the  unblurred  photographs  of  adjacent  houses  which  were  handily 
available from Google Street View itself. 
Hence we have an example where not appearing in a dataset identifies a person via 
analysis  of  that  dataset.  It  is  extremely  hard  to  preserve  privacy  when  one  is  a 
minority presence in a transparent world. Given that difficulty, we need to understand UNCLASSIFIED 





how transparency affects privacy, where the threats are, and how they can be curtailed 
in order that privacy retains sufficient protection to allow us to live our public and 
private lives unhindered by unwelcome interference. 
2.2.2  Potential risks to privacy 
The theoretical possibility of a threat to privacy by transparency has been discussed. 
What about the practical prospect in the UK in 2011? 
Encouragingly,  the  Public  Data  Principles  are  prefaced  with  the  following  clear 
statement. 
―Public  Data‖  is  the  objective,  factual,  non-personal  data  on  which  public 
services  run  and  are  assessed,  and  on  which  policy  decisions  are  based,  or 
which  is  collected  or  generated  in  the  course  of  public  service  delivery. 
(Transparency Board 2010) 
The Minister for the Cabinet Office has explicitly emphasised this definition of public 
data as specifically non-personal. 
However, despite my profound belief that transparency is transformative in its 
effects, it is crucial to be clear about the type of transparency we mean. We 
want to be transparent about anonymised corporate data, we do not want to 
publish the public‘s personal details. Personal privacy is the bedrock of a free 
society,  and  is  as  important  a  guiding  principle  for  this  government  as 
transparency. That is why our commitment to making government more open 
goes hand in hand with our commitment to strengthen civil liberties. So as we 
move forward with our plans for government transparency, it is imperative that 
we  continue  to  strike  the  right  balance  between  this  openness  agenda  and 
individual privacy. (Maude 2010) 
Nevertheless,  where  the  citizen  and  the  state  interact,  and  the  performance  of 
government agencies depends on the behaviour of individuals, data about government 
may indeed include data about individuals. The crime data released on 1
st February, 
2011 are an example of this kind of case, as are some of the datasets mentioned in the 
Prime  Minister‘s  letter  to  Cabinet  Ministers  of  7
th  July,  2011  (Cameron  2011), 
particularly  with  regard  to  health,  education  and  criminal  justice.  Definitions  of 
‗personal data‘ are not sufficiently precise to be of a great deal of help in borderline 
cases such as these. It is not always easy to tell whether someone is identifiable from a 
dataset, or from a combination of that datasets with others (some of which might be 
very rich sources of information, such as newspaper reports, or material placed on 
social networking sites). The grey areas here are very grey; it is not a simple matter to 
examine data and determine whether or not data subjects are identifiable. 
We should also note that the ultimate aim of the transparency programme in the UK is 
to  move  from  the  current  top-down  regime  to  a  more  demand-driven  one  where 
citizens can express their interest in particular datasets. Because the initial programme 
was rather more focused on the accountability agenda than on the information agenda, 
there was a corresponding focus on comparable data that express something about 
how  well  a  department  or  agency  is  functioning.  Personal  data  could  easily  be 
selected out. If we move to something closer to the information agenda, then citizens 
will begin to demand data that is meaningful for them – which will naturally include 
some data that could be personal, including health data, educational data and criminal 
justice data (Cameron 2011 has moved in this direction). Of course such data will not UNCLASSIFIED 





and should not be released automatically and will be anonymised, but there will be 
debates  in  the  foreseeable  future  in  which  privacy  and  transparency  will  be  in 
immediate tension. In such cases hard decisions will need to be taken about whether 
the public goods which are hoped to follow from data releases can be sufficient to 
justify invasions of privacy. 
In his latest letter (Cameron 2011), the Prime Minister committed to release a number 
of anonymised datasets in open standardised formats under the Open Government 
Licence, many of which are tailored to the information agenda and which will be very 
valuable to communities. Of these commitments, perhaps the most striking from a 
privacy point of view is ―opening up access to anonymised data from the National 
Pupil Database to help parents and pupils to monitor the performance of their schools 
in depth, from June 2012. This will enable better comparisons of school performance 
and we will look to strengthen datasets in due course.‖ 
I do not wish to go into detail about the datasets considered for release in (Cameron 
2011); as I argue elsewhere, whether a particular data release is unacceptably risky 
should be determined by relevant experts in context, not by crafting general-purpose 
rules in advance. However, there is no doubt that the 2011 commitments will require 
the release of anonymised datasets, and there are issues concerning the effectiveness 
of anonymisation and the levels of risk of deanonymisation, which will be explored 
further in section 4 below. UNCLASSIFIED 





3  Trust, privacy and transparency 
Any transparency programme needs to be sustainable. For this to happen, it will need 
to retain the confidence of the citizenry. In any system where data are required to be 
provided on a regular basis, and where data consumers interact in a relatively sporadic 
and infrequent way with the system, there is a danger that over time the system will 
start to serve the providers‘ interests rather than the consumers‘ (Wilson 1980, Fung 
et al 2007, 11, 106, 109). Citizens need to know that transparency serves them as well 
as or better than it does the providers, in order to have sufficient confidence in the 
system to make it a success. They also need to be confident that the data provided are 
as complete and accurate as possible, and to be sure that the data are more likely to be 
used for their benefit than to their detriment. 
There are many important factors in the maintenance of trust, but privacy is central to 
the concerns of this review. If citizens come to believe that an effect of the release of 
public data will be a significant decrease in privacy, then the result will inevitably be 
a  withdrawal  of  support  and  a  reduction  in  the  democratic  legitimacy  of  the 
programme. 
It follows that the maintenance of privacy, as the Minister for the Cabinet Office has 
argued, is essential to preserve confidence, and the best way to do that is to embed 
privacy protection within the programme itself, rather than having it  as  a  bolt-on 
component.  If  the  processes  underlying  the  transparency  programme  are  clearly 
privacy-preserving (and seen to be so), then public confidence (in that aspect of the 
programme at least) should be retained. Far from being in opposition to transparency, 
privacy is necessary for it. 
In this section, I shall explore this issue in more detail. I shall begin with a discussion 
of public attitudes to privacy, and then consider the role of political and technical 
debate  about  privacy  in  fostering  confidence  in  transparency.  Legal  redress  for 
breaches  of  privacy  is  of  great  importance,  and  will  be  discussed  in  section  3.3. 
Section 3.4 discusses the role of transparency about transparency in creating trust and 
confidence. Finally, section 3.5 raises the question of whether transparency might be 
aided without damage to privacy if there were different classes of personal data. 
3.1  The citizen’s reasonable expectations 
3.1.1  Privacy and context 
Public attitudes to privacy can appear confused or inconsistent. Surveys show a great 
interest  in  privacy  (e.g. Bradwell 2010), but  actual behaviour (for example, using 
online social networking sites) often reveals a rather cavalier attitude, as people give 
away and publish intimate details of their lives (e.g. Joinson & Payne 2007). These 
apparent  confusions,  however, can often be explained away as  caused by shifting 
contexts,  ignorance, inappropriate levels  of abstraction in  presenting a  problem to 
people, and varying attitudes to privacy, in particular between generations. Let us 
briefly consider these in turn. 
Context.  Privacy  is  not  only  about  what  information  is  around,  but  many  other 
matters connected with the social situation (Nissenbaum 2010, and see section 3.1.4 
for more detail on her work). Of course we have varying attitudes about who knows 
what – I might be comfortable with my doctor knowing fact A, my bank manager UNCLASSIFIED 





knowing fact B, and my friends knowing fact C, but extremely uncomfortable with 
anyone knowing the conjunction of these facts. But context goes further than this – 
even the method of transmission of information is important. If I ask my wife what 
she is doing tomorrow, she will tell me (I complacently assume). She is comfortable 
with my having that information. However, if I didn‘t ask her, and discovered the 
same  information  by  looking  in  her  diary  without  permission,  she  might  well  be 
justifiably annoyed. And if I sent a FoI request to her PA for the information, relations 
might  become  extremely  tense,  not  to  say  glacial,  at  home.  Yet  it  is  the  same 
information I receive each time; the relevant difference is the method of acquisition. 
Ignorance.  In  2010  the  websites  pleaserobme.com  and  icanstalku.com  achieved 
notoriety  by  raising  awareness  that  people  were  inadvertently  sharing  information 
about  their  whereabouts  using  Twitter  and  releasing  geotagged  information  (for 
instance photographs with the location embedded in the metadata). Someone  who 
tweeted that they were at a lecture or a concert, thereby revealed to anyone following 
their Twitter feed that they were not at home. Someone who placed a photograph of 
their own home on a photo-sharing site such as Flickr, and tagged it as such, could 
reveal where they lived (since the location of the camera, sometimes contained in its 
metadata, would of course be close to the location of their home). 
In other types of case, people would place revealing photographs of themselves and 
their friends online, and describe aspects of their lives on social networking sites such 
as  Facebook.  Surveys  (e.g.  Karyda  &  Kokolakis  2008)  have  shown  that  people 
sometimes had very little awareness of the implications of their actions – for instance, 
it is not widely appreciated that Facebook owns the data on its site, and that its most 
promising business models are based around the targeted advertising that access to 
those data makes possible. 
Abstraction. Any breach of privacy takes place in a specific context where there are 
often benefits  that can  be achieved by sacrificing privacy.  For instance, a mobile 
phone gives one‘s position away as it locates and interacts with the nearest antenna; 
this  is  naturally  privacy-invasive  as  it  tells  the  phone  network  where  one  is  (for 
example, it has recently been revealed that Apple iPhones and 3G iPads have been 
storing data about the devices‘ whereabouts in unencrypted form – Allan & Warden 
2011),  but  the  convenience  of  mobile  phones  means  that  people  are  prepared  to 
discount that worry. People collect points with store cards, even though it means that 
supermarkets  are  able  to  build  up  detailed  databases  of  their  likes,  dislikes  and 
patterns of purchase. An intimate blog may reveal many details about one‘s personal 
life,  but  the  gain  in  self-expression  and  assertion  is  usually  felt  to  compensate 
(interestingly, many explicit bloggers are embarrassed when their friends or family 
read their writings, but have no problem with total strangers – de Laat 2008). In the 
abstract,  the  issues  surrounding  location-based  privacy,  or  commerce,  or  intimate 
blogging,  seem  remote  and  hard  to  comprehend.  In  some  (perhaps  only  a  few) 
particular circumstances, however, one‘s behaviour may lead one into unanticipated, 
though avoidable, problems. 
Attitudes.  It  is  also  widely  thought  that  there  is  a  generation  gap  in  attitudes  to 
privacy. Some believe that younger people have no interest in privacy, but this is 
false. Rather, there is a difference in interpretation of privacy. UNCLASSIFIED 





  Among older people, a control model predominates (and this is reflected in 
most privacy law). The person feels private when he or she is able to control 
others‘ access to information about him- or herself. 
  Among younger people, an anonymity model predominates. The person feels 
private if freely available information cannot be connected with him or her (cf 
boyd 2008). 
Younger  people  (digital  natives,  to  use  a  common  term)  have  become  very 
experienced in negotiating the benefits and pitfalls of sharing information for social 
ends. It may be that over-enthusiastic information sharing is unwise and will tend to 
get out of one‘s control (Bailey & Kerr 2007), but even people who have revealed 
major aspects of their lives online usually have an interest in preserving their privacy 
to an extent that suits them. 
In summary, privacy makes sense only in a particular context. Without knowing what 
information may or may not be shared, with whom, for what reason, in what form, 
and for what potential benefit, privacy is a meaningless abstraction – something, like 
motherhood and apple pie, that virtually everyone is in favour of. 
3.1.2  Use Limitation 
It follows from this that one way of making decisions about privacy is to fix the 
context of data. This principle is enshrined in a number of privacy codes, and is often 
referred to as the use limitation principle. For instance, an influential set of OECD 
guidelines (non-binding, but which have been incorporated into a number of binding 
statutes and conventions over the years) published as long ago as 1980 (OECD 1980) 
set out the Purpose Specification Principle and the Use Limitation Principle. 
Purpose Specification Principle 
9. The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not 
later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the 
fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those 
purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose. 
Use Limitation Principle 
10. Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for 
purposes other than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 9 except: 
  a) with the consent of the data subject; or 
  b) by the authority of law. 
There are privacy-preserving merits about such principles, as they provide the data 
subject with the context in which data will be used. If personal data are used other 
than for the original purposes, then either the new use has the force of law behind it 
(in which case the subject would in any case have no right to prevent it happening), 
or will have to be explained to the subject when his or her informed consent is 
sought.  It  has  been  argued  that  use  limitation  is  increasingly  important  in  the 
protection of privacy (Brown 2010). 
However, the application of these principles is not as simple as one might hope. UNCLASSIFIED 





3.1.3  Transparency and context 
It is obvious that the principles do not sit very well with the ideology of transparency. 
The whole point of transparency is that serendipitous reuse of data is powerful – one 
cannot predict all the circumstances in which data will be valuable. Hence, when data 
are published on the Web, not only can one not say how they will be used, the whole 
aim  is  for  them  to  be  used  in  an  unexpected  way.  Against  the  Use  Limitation 
Principle, the transparency ideology places a Use Maximisation Principle for non-
personal data (recall, for instance, in the UK public data are specifically defined as 
non-personal  data).  Transparency  demands  that  the  contexts  in  which  data  are 
released are unlimited by terms and conditions, representational and formatting issues, 
and  so  on.  Because  the  Use  Maximisation  Principle  of  transparency  applies  to  a 
different set of data to the Use Limitation Principle, there should be no clash. If data 
are personal data, then the Use Limitation Principle will trump use maximisation. 
However, there will be grey areas. The transparency argument that there is a great 
public interest in the unlimited dissemination of data should not be dismissed out of 
hand, especially if it is unclear whether a dataset is personal data or not. 
In  short,  the  philosophy  of  transparency  actively  seeks  out  new  contexts  for 
information and data. To the extent that such a philosophy is accepted, instruments 
such as the Use Limitation Principle will be problematic; to the extent that purpose 
specification and use limitation are adhered to, transparency is handicapped. 
3.1.4  Context and expectations: the theory of contextual integrity 
Failure  to  understand  the  importance  of  context  to  privacy,  and  the  potency  of 
context-relative expectations for privacy perceptions, is one of the main explanations 
of the difficulties in developing privacy policies for new technologies and institutions, 
according to academic commentator Helen Nissenbaum (2010). Nissenbaum‘s theory 
of contextual integrity is a useful tool in this space. This recommends specifying the 
social context in which a data management practice takes place, understanding the 
norms, expectations and actors which are active in the context, and specifying the data 
and information  flows  characteristic of a new practice  – in  other  words,  what  do 
people expect  to happen, and what  actually will happen when  a new  information 
management practice (in our case, the release of datasets onto the Web with little or 
no restriction) is put in place? 
If we think of transparency using this framework (cf. Nissenbaum 2010, 182-183), we 
find  some  constant  factors.  New  methods  of  transmission  of  data  by  publishing 
datasets online for the world to download bring a whole new set of actors into the 
context – all those people who were previously unable to get the information because 
it was held by government. Other aspects of the context are broadly unaffected. 
Two sorts of evaluation are required. The first must issue from the context itself: will 
the data release undermine the aims and goals of legitimate actors in the context? To 
take the example of the crime data released monthly from 2011, will the release of 
crime data make the police‘s job  harder? For example, will people, knowing that 
‗their‘ crime, of which they were a victim, will appear on a crime map, be reluctant to 
report crime for some reason as a result, thereby causing degradation in the quality of 
crime data themselves? If so, then a rethink will be necessary. 
The second is a wider examination of the moral and political factors in operation in 
the  particular  context.  In  particular,  could  the  data  release  cause  a  reduction  in UNCLASSIFIED 





autonomy or privacy in this or other contexts? Could it cause unjust outcomes? Could 
some  agent  gain  unwarranted  power  via  processing  of  the  data?  Will  people‘s 
reasonable expectations of privacy in that context be completely undermined, so that 
they are acting under a set of expectations (e.g. confidentiality) that are now false? 
Understanding  the  expectations  and  norms  in  any  particular  domain  enables  the 
maintenance  of  the  contextual  integrity  of  the  situation.  This  will  be  extremely 
important for retaining the legitimacy of the transparency programme, by ensuring 
that no radically new data management practices are imposed upon an unwilling and 
unprepared public. However, gaining that understanding is not as easy as it might 
sound. At a minimum, those pushing forward with transparency need to be highly 
aware, and not dismissive, of public opinion, and need to devise process management 
institutions which include widespread consultations and sample a range of opinion (in 
the recommendations to this report, I shall recommend a process structure that brings 
in such a range). 
3.1.5  Empowerment and consent 
One desirable feature of data management systems is that they should empower the 
subjects of data where possible. The obvious method here is via consent of the subject 
about the treatment of personal data about him or her. Consent is an important part of 
the Use Limitation Principle. 
However, consent is something of a blunt instrument. The current model of consent is 
somewhat unsatisfactory – for example, on a website, one is presented with a link to a 
long,  complex  and  tedious  privacy  policy,  and  one  ticks  a  box  to  show  that  one 
accepts it. Few are capable of understanding such policies, and even fewer bother to 
read them. Yet by giving consent to one‘s data being used in this very binary fashion, 
one  may  be  signing  up  to  more  than  one  bargained  for.  To  take  one  example, 
Facebook‘s privacy policies shifted from an opt-in to making data available to third 
parties, to an opt-out – yet it was not required to ask for its users‘ consent for this 
significant  change.  The  original  consent  for  a  totally  different  policy  is  deemed 
adequate. 
Furthermore,  consent  may  well  not  be  such  a  black-and-white  issue.  There  are 
nuances – one may consent in some circumstances to the use of one‘s data, and not in 
others. 
There are good reasons to explore making consent a much more useful tool in the 
context of transparency. At the moment, the binary yes/no model is not very useful. A 
more nuanced approach, that would not only allow a subject to differentiate between 
contexts, but also allow the revocation or reinstatement of consent even after a dataset 
is released is an attractive option, if at all possible (Whitley 2009, Bonnici & Coles-
Kemp 2010, Coles-Kemp & Kani-Zabihi 2010). 
At the moment, however, the bureaucratic overhead of managing such a system would 
be too great for a transparency programme to undertake. As noted in section 2.1.1, the 
management of transparency has to be as lean as possible. Nevertheless, there are 
research projects in the UK currently looking at mechanisms, institutions, formalisms 
and architectures for supporting detailed and sophisticated consent management (cf. 
Encore,  ENsuring  COnsent  &  REvocation,  http://www.encore-project.info/,  and 
VOME, Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression, http://www.vome.org.uk/), 
and  the  outputs  of  these  projects  should  be  considered  by  future  managers  of UNCLASSIFIED 





departments‘ transparency programmes. Currently, this research is not at a mature 
stage, but it is an important and promising direction in which to go. 
Hence, as current consent mechanisms are (a) not very empowering, (b) bureaucratic 
in  operation,  and  therefore  (c) unsatisfactory,  I  shall  not  include  any  universally-
binding recommendations about including consent in this review (although it may be 
appropriate in some contexts which I will try to specify – see recommendation 1). 
However, this is a promising direction for research, and the state-of-the-art should be 
kept under review. 
3.2  The role of debate 
Given the somewhat difficult state of the law with regard to data protection (which as 
we will see in section 4 will get even murkier, once we see how hard it is to decide 
what  is  and  what  is  not  ‗identifiable‘),  there  is  an  enhanced  role  for  debate  and 
discussion  to  play  in  the  transparency  programme.  Complex  legal  and  technical 
argument needs to be amalgamated into a cogent decision-making process, which will 
be important evidence about whether government has been properly careful of, or 
alternatively negligent with, citizens‘ privacy. 
3.2.1  An ideal structure 
Ideally, a transparency programme would be driven by information providers with 
strong interests and incentives to publish. A government department would wish to 
publish some data, perhaps in response to requests from the public. It would examine 
the case internally (and transparently), and be enthused about the public interest in 
putting the data out. Meanwhile, defenders of privacy would be invited to scrutinise 
the  proposed  release.  If  there  was  a  prima  facie  case  for  redaction,  aggregation, 
further anonymisation or even scrapping the release altogether, the department and the 
privacy activists should debate it out in some democratically legitimate forum. In 
short, information providers would be transparency enthusiasts, and they should be 
made to prove their case under rigorous scrutiny. 
This, sadly, is unrealistic in the general case, though a model exists in the Office for 
National  Statistics‘  Microdata  Release  Panel 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/ns_ons/ons_microdata_releases.asp),  which 
scrutinises requests for access to unpublished microdata. It should be noted that these 
releases are not transparent in the sense used in this report. In order to protect the 
confidentiality  of  the  data  subject,  releases  are  governed  by  confidentiality 
agreements, are available only to recognised institutions and appropriate individuals 
and for specific statistical purposes, so that the ONS retains a measure of control. 
As noted, privacy (alongside other convenient arguments against transparency, such 
as  national  security  and  accuracy)  is  likely  to  be  used  as  a  delaying  tactic.  A 
government department which was less than enthusiastic about transparency would be 
less than committed to assembling the best case for a data release. The history of 
transparency shows that only rarely do information providers become enthusiasts (cf. 
Fung et al 2007), and that they are as likely to try to subvert or manipulate the system 
as  to  take  part  freely  and  openly.  One  naturally  anticipates  a  culture  change  in 
Whitehall, but there is no reason to think that it will be either speedy or consistently 
spread across departments. UNCLASSIFIED 





Nevertheless, the key notions of the envisaged debate – rigour, transparency, detailed 
scrutiny  and  advocacy  for  both  transparency  and  privacy  –  are  important  and 
attractive in this context. 
3.2.2  Content of the debate 
What would the debate need to cover? As we shall see in section 4, there can be no 
guarantees  about  the  safety  of  a  particular  data  release,  even  of  anonymised  or 
aggregated data, and it is undesirable to continue to conduct our affairs in this space 
under the pretence that it is. 
The issues that therefore need to be addressed in any decision about a data release 
onto the Web are the risks of release, and the potential benefits. The debate, therefore, 
should be a risk/benefit analysis. 
It is important that the analysis is not ‗captured‘ or driven by a particular interested 
party, and that the outcome is not pre-determined. Such a debate therefore demands 
the representation of diverse stakeholders, ideally including those demanding the data, 
and who therefore can provide some context for the discussion. In recommendation 7, 
I shall suggest a list of the stakeholders who would ideally be present. 
Nissenbaum (2010, 181-183) provides a decision heuristic, based on her theory of 
contextual integrity, for deciding on whether to introduce a technological innovation, 
and if so how to regulate it. Those taking part in the debate may or may not subscribe 
to her theory, but her heuristic provides a good structure independently of whether her 
theory is being followed. She advocates looking at structural aspects of the context, 
and then at the following issues: 
  A prima facie assessment. 
  Evaluation of the moral and political factors affected by the data release. 
  Evaluation of how the data release affects the goals and values of the context. 
The  debate  could  either  result  in  a  decision,  or  a  report.  Whoever  did  make  the 
decision  would  need  to  compare  risks  and  benefits  and  decide  accordingly.  What 
seems correct (and acceptable to the public) will vary depending on social, political 
and intellectual attitudes of the day. I therefore do not wish to suggest particular rules, 
restrictions or constraints at this point. 
3.2.3  Debate and audit 
A detailed debate between those proposing a data release and those opposing has 
much to commend it. In the first place, open debate would enable the relevant points 
to be put and tested, and would be more likely than any other forum to uncover and 
quantify potential risks to privacy, and benefits of transparency. Debate will enable a 
more accurate and objective model of threats and opportunities to be constructed. 
Second, transparent public debate (e.g. with detailed minutes published online) will 
facilitate media scrutiny. 
Third, visible evidence of careful attention to detail and protecting privacy would help 
the  public  appreciate  the  commitment  within  the  transparency  programme  to  the 
protection of its interests. Confidence in the programme would be more likely to be 
maintained if it were clear that issues pertaining to privacy were taken seriously, and 
embedded in the process itself. UNCLASSIFIED 





Fourth, in the event that a data release came before a court, the rehearsal of the debate 
would  clearly  be  valuable  for  the  government  in  constructing  its  case.  The 
involvement  of  experts  in  debate  and  scrutiny  would  mean  that  the  important 
arguments would have received an airing. In the event that a data release was being 
contemplated that could possibly be challenged under Article 8 (which is unlikely in 
the near future, but which cannot be ruled out  absolutely), the debate would help 
determine  which  of  the  Article  8  qualifications  (national  security,  public  safety, 
economic  well-being  etc.)  was  being  invoked.  The  very  existence  of  a  scrutiny 
process that was prior to, and as rigorous as, the legal process would anyway help 
lower the risk of legal proceedings being brought. 
Fifth, whereas a legal debate is focused very much on legality, a debate that brings in 
experts from beyond the legal discipline together with lawyers will be of much greater 
value  in  promoting  confidence.  The  use  of  technical  experts  who  understand 
procedures for deanonymising data, for instance, would inform any discussion of the 
likelihood of data subjects being reidentified. As noted above, it is important for the 
success  of  transparency  that  it  retains  the  confidence  and  trust  of  citizens;  if  the 
government‘s actions are morally dubious, technologically uninformed, or against the 
contextual norms and expectations of citizens, the fact that they are nonetheless legal 
will hardly promote trust. 
Sixth, such a debate will help promote awareness and disseminate best practice among 
privacy professionals. This would be of particular value for Chief Privacy Officers 
and  managers  of  small  to  medium-sized  enterprises  who  have  to  deal,  on  slim 
resources  and  often  with  little  training  available,  with  difficult  issues  about  data 
sharing. It may also help promote consistency across the sector. 
The account of the debate and its outcome would resemble a forensic Privacy Impact 
Assessment  in  many  ways  (PIA  –  for  the  ICO‘s  advice  on  PIAs,  see 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pia_handbook_html_v2/index.html).  Its 
publication would be an important resource for those with interests in the application 
and regulation of transparency and privacy. 
3.3  Harms and remedies 
The approach of European privacy law, attempting to anticipate and regulate harms in 
advance, is problematic in this sphere, as the nature and extent of those harms are so 
unclear. In the US, the existence of specific privacy torts (Prosser 1960, Soma & 
Rynerson  2008,  31-43)  has  the  advantage  of  allowing  releases  of  data  under  a 
transparency programme, but the disadvantage of doing nothing to address risk (at 
least until a court has ruled on a specific existing problem). There is a difference of 
opinion about the existence of a privacy tort in the UK; Wacks (2006) argues that 
judges are not interested in privacy, and tend to use other doctrines such as breach of 
confidence as a poor substitute for a privacy tort, while Phillipson (2006) maintains 
that actually breach of confidence has morphed into a privacy tort properly so-called, 
although even this falls far short of the protection that the European Court of Human 
Rights  seems  to  assume.  Both,  however,  seem  to  concur  that  privacy  is  strongly 
associated with breach of confidence in UK law, and that the protection is not very 
great. UNCLASSIFIED 





Certainly  any  transparency  programme  worth  the  name  needs  to  consider  the 
possibility of harms resulting from the release of government data onto the Web, and 
means of remedy. 
Insisting on citizens‘ having recourse to the courts seems entirely unsatisfactory. This 
is  generally  a  time-consuming  and  expensive  process  that  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  undergo  for  an  ordinary  person  (even  celebrities  have  been  known  to 
struggle). Even with legal aid or no-win-no-fee agreements, this would be a tough and 
off-putting course of action to have to take. 
Furthermore, the release of large datasets raises the possibility that many cases may 
hit the courts at the same time if the privacy of a number of people is compromised. 
Finally, the possibility of jigsaw identification of a data subject means that it may be 
very hard to prove that a government dataset breached a citizen‘s privacy rights, as the 
identification might have used data from a number of more or less innocuous sets. The 
government data might not have been especially worrying – as we shall see in section 
4, the science of deanonymisation has made impressive advances, and information 
valuable to an adversary can be constructed from apparently unproblematic data. 
Currently, one role of the Information Commissioner (IC) is to administer fines for 
breaching the Data Protection Act. It can also investigate complaints from the public, 
although it cannot award compensation. The IC should therefore remain the judge of 
whether a data release under the transparency programme incurred too great a risk – 
in making this judgement, the debate trail discussed in section 3.2.3 above should be a 
valuable tool for the IC. 
One function that the IC currently does not have is the ability to compensate those 
who have had privacy breached. This may not be too important an omission, as a 
privacy breach may not lead to direct financial loss for a victim – rather the harm 
would be less tangible and arguably irremediable by financial means. 
The needs of a future where transparency was an assumption of government are hard 
to judge in the absence of evidence about what such a world would look like. Hence it 
would seem that there are two questions which will need to be kept under review. 
  How many cases are reaching the ICO? It may be that the ICO is swamped by 
cases as a result of data releases about a substantial number of people. In that 
event, there may need to be new rules, or even a new institution, to prevent the 
ICO being overwhelmed. One has also to note that if many aggrieved citizens 
were moved to complain, it would be hard to see how public confidence and 
trust in transparency could survive. 
  Are there significant levels of financial loss or other types of loss as a result of 
privacy breaches for which a just remedy would be financial compensation? 
3.4  Metatransparency 
I  have  made  the  argument  that  the  UK‘s  transparency  programme  depends  on 
retaining  the  trust  and  confidence  of  the  public.  This  depends  on  ensuring  that 
citizens‘  interests,  including  but  not  restricted  to  privacy  interests,  are  central  to 
decision-making.  It  also  follows  from  this  that  citizens  need  to  be  sure  that 
transparency is not a way of pushing one particular political agenda, and that the data 
released under the transparency programme are chosen for their value to citizens both UNCLASSIFIED 





for holding government to account, and as a means of gaining a rich picture of their 
community. 
To this end, the most obvious principle that should attach to transparency is what we 
might call metatransparency, or more prosaically transparency about transparency. 
The decision-making about transparency should be as clear and open as about any 
other government business. This entails a number of things, of which perhaps the 
most important are: 
  Transparency of data assets. Releases of data are generally welcome, and the 
data should be accompanied by metadata contextualising and explaining the 
principles underlying the data. It is also important for citizens to know what 
other relevant data have been collected, whether those data are available, and 
if  not  why  not.  In  this  way,  consumers  of  data  will  be  able  to  make  a 
judgement about whether the data they have got give a clear or biased, full or 
partial picture. Datasets should be described, but need not be released if there 
is good reason not to (e.g. to protect privacy). 
  Transparency  of  debate.  As  noted  in  section  3.2.3,  there  will  need  to  be 
discussions about the dangers to privacy from the release of some datasets. 
These debates, if conducted in good faith and released in full, will be very 
important for increasing trust that citizens‘ privacy is being properly protected, 
and that data releases are being properly scrutinised. 
3.5  Personal, public and private 
Nissenbaum‘s  discussion  in  terms  of  context  helps  explain  why  it  has  proved 
extremely difficult to draw a neat line around private space, to delineate it from the 
public, and why when the situation changes (as for example when new technologies 
appear), previously unexpected fuzziness or underspecified boundaries are revealed 
(Nissenbaum 2010, 89-102). It is very difficult, in the absence of a specified context, 
to determine exactly what is public and what private; there are many clear-cut cases, 
but the boundaries are very hard to draw. It may be that the publication of certain 
types of personal data would be less harmful, and perhaps (given a public interest 
argument) even welcomed by the public. 
This sort of distinction is made by the German courts, which recognise three spheres 
of  personality,  the  intimate,  the  private  and  the  individual.  The  intimate  sphere 
includes thoughts and feelings, sexual behaviour and health information, and receives 
maximal  protection.  The  private  sphere,  which  includes  information  about  one‘s 
family life, gets qualified protection. The individual sphere, which relates to one‘s 
public, professional and economic life, gets the lowest level of  protection (Wacks 
2010, 67-68). 
However, there is a strong doubt uncontroversial, non-damaging personal data and 
more intimate personal data can be treated differently. Recent discoveries in the world 
of computer science and computer security have effectively ruled out the distinction. 
These discoveries, and technological responses currently under exploration, will be 
discussed in the next section. UNCLASSIFIED 





4  The science of deanonymisation 
In this section, I shall examine the use of technology to deanonymise datasets that 
contain personal data. In recent years, the anonymisation and pseudonomisation of 
datasets have been used as important methods to preserve (much of) the utility of data, 
and allow it to be shared (or sold) without incurring bureaucratic costs of compliance 
with data protection laws. However, this broad strategy is under challenge; various 
theoretical results have undermined assumptions about the safety of anonymisation 
and pseudonymisation. I emphasise that these results are theoretical, and that there is 
very  little  empirical  evidence  that  this  theoretical  risk  translates  into  a  real-world 
threat, but it is nevertheless a serious issue for any transparency programme, which 
can only thrive to the extent that the data that it produces has utility. It could be a 
serious constraint if utility has to be severely curtailed to preserve anonymity because 
of the dangers of identification of data subjects. 
Alternatives to anonymisation will be considered, but they will also prove problematic 
in the context of transparency. 
4.1  Anonymise-and-forget 
Anonymisation has been used for a long time as a means to enable data controllers to 
share data without revealing the names of data subjects, whether within their own 
organisations  or  with  the  outside  world,  and  whether  done  pro  bono  or  as  a 
commercial transaction. With regard to transparency, it is clear that anonymisation, if 
it lived up to its name and genuinely rendered the data subjects anonymous, would be 
a  powerful  tool  for  a  transparency  programme,  which  could  release  valuable  and 
desirable datasets about people with little or no risk of their reidentification. 
4.1.1  Anonymisation 
To anonymise a dataset is to manipulate the data in order to make it very difficult to 
identify the data subjects. Typically this is done by diluting the information content, 
making the dataset less specific. The most obvious ways to do this are to remove 
identifying information from the set (suppression), to aggregate it, or and to abstract. 
So, for example, if we had an entry in a database that read: 
Name  Age  Salary  Profession 
Ichabod 
Thrusthaven 
37  £30,000  Logistics  services 
manager 
Then an example of suppression would be to delete the cell containing the subject‘s 
name  (or  to  replace  it  with  some  non-connoting  identifier,  such  as  an  arbitrarily 
assigned  reference  number).  Examples  of  abstraction  would  be  to  express  the 
subject‘s  age  as  part  of  a  range  (e.g.  31-40),  or  his  profession  as  a  predefined 
category, such as ‗managerial‘. Aggregation means to take the data (e.g. the salary 
data), and release it in some kind of aggregate form, such as the average salary of all 
the people in  the dataset,  which is  not associated with  any individual subject.  Of 
course all these types of change reduce the value of the data in the dataset, but they 
help preserve the privacy of the subject. 
A variant of anonymisation is pseudonymisation, where the identifiers in the data are 
replaced  consistently  with  artificially-generated  identifiers.  This  allows  connected UNCLASSIFIED 





data  entries  to  be  linked  together,  preserving  the  value  of  the  connections.  For 
instance, in the above example, the name ‗Ichabod Thrusthaven‘ could be replaced 
throughout  the  data,  wherever  it  appeared,  with  the  same  numerical  identifier, 
randomly-generated especially  for the purpose, e.g. ‗39484‘. Then the data would 
allow  certain  limited  inferences  to  be  drawn  –  for  instance,  that  the  person  who 
attended a clinic on 30
th January for alcoholism was the same person who saw a 
consultant  on  three  occasions  in  July  for  memory  problems  –  clearly  a  valuable 
resource, even if the data do not allow the data processor to identify the person by 
name. 
A further method of protecting privacy is  to  perturb or put  noise into the data  – 
deliberately changing some values while keeping important aggregates constant. So, 
for instance,  Ichabod‘s  salary could  be  given, falsely,  as  £40,000, while someone 
else‘s could be given as £10,000 less than it actually is, thereby keeping the average 
salary of the subjects of the data the same. 
In the rest of this report, I shall concentrate on anonymisation, although the same 
issues pertain to pseudonymisation (the AOL dataset discussed in section 4.1.3 below 
was pseudonymised, for example). Furthermore, one can assume that any reasonably 
sophisticated anonymisation or pseudonymisation method will include perturbation of 
the data. Broadly speaking, anonymised data are less useful than pseudonymised data, 
because one cannot tell, for example, whether two separate pieces of data apply to the 
same  data  subject.  For  the  same  reason,  however,  anonymisation  is  less  risky. 
However, with respect to the arguments discussed in this report, the distinction is not 
important, and I shall use the term ‗anonymised‘ to mean data from which the subject 
is not intended to be identifiable. 
4.1.2  Sharing anonymised data 
The idea of anonymisation led to the doctrine/method of anonymise-and-forget or 
release-and-forget – a data controller can get maximum social value from the data he 
or  she  controls  by  anonymising  it  and  then  putting  it  out  into  the  outside  world 
(whether for money or not), allowing others to extract value from it. Once the data 
have left his or her control, then it is no longer their problem. 
Under this regime, data which may identify data subjects are anonymised, removing 
information from the dataset so that people cannot be identified from it. Then the data 
could be released, sold or published for free download without any privacy or data 
protection issue. 
Legally,  sufficiently  rigorous  anonymisation  has  been  held  to  get  around  data 
protection law. If the identifiers are removed from a datum, then it is deemed that the 
subject  is  not  identifiable,  and  that  therefore  it  is  not  personal  data.  Where 
anonymisation has not  been robust, or when it has not been adequate, there have 
conversely been legal problems. For instance, Anderson (2008, 294-295) gives an 
example of health service data in the UK in which people were de-identified and then 
re-identified later, so that people who had participated in the data collection under 
assurances of anonymity had been deceived. Other datasets were kept, supposedly 
anonymised, but with date of birth and postcodes intact, making the subjects highly 
identifiable. 
There are obvious attractions to this model, which has been used for many years, for 
example in the health sector, without serious compromise of privacy (Kelsey 2009), UNCLASSIFIED 





but  sadly,  recent  work  in  the  field  (in  particular  Ohm  2010)  has  shown  that 
anonymise-and-forget  provides  less  protection  from  someone  trying  illicitly  to 
reidentify data subjects than has previously been thought (I shall follow usual practice 
in calling such a person an adversary). In this section, I shall describe the anonymise-
and-forget  model,  and  in  section  4.2  discuss  its  flaws  (which,  to  be  fair  to  data 
controllers, have only recently become obvious). 
4.1.3  Failures of anonymity 
Merely anonymising data may not be enough to make subjects unidentifiable from the 
data in the dataset considered in isolation. In the United States, Latanya Sweeney 
(1997) proved some years ago that information that may not appear to be identifying 
can, taken together, be very potent. 
I conducted experiments that demonstrated how de-identified health data can be 
linked to a population register in order to re-identify by name the persons who 
are the subjects of the health information. Using the voter list for Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, I showed how a few demographics combine to uniquely identify 
individuals. It was found that 12% of the 54,805 voters had unique birth dates 
(month, day and year of birth). Therefore, any information on these individuals 
that  included  birth  date  and  city,  would  almost  certainly  be  specific  to  the 
named individuals. Further, birth date and gender together were unique for 29%, 
birth date and a 5-digit ZIP (postal code) were unique for 69% and birth date 
and  the  full  9-digit  ZIP  were  unique  for  97%  of  the  voters.  These  results 
demonstrate  that  combinations  of  characteristics  can  combine  to  construct  a 
unique  or  near-unique  identifier  which  is  termed  a  quasi-identifier.  These 
results further show that the typical de-identification technique applied when 
releasing information for public-use in the United States, does not render the 
result anonymous. (Sweeney n.d., 21) 
Many datasets contain quasi-identifiers as Sweeney discusses here, such as postcodes 
(possibly abridged, with the first three or four digits), gender and birthdate; these will 
raise the risks of identification. 
As an example that occurred with a pseudonymised dataset, in 2006, the American 
Internet  services  company  AOL  released  –  onto  a  website  for  download  by 
researchers into online behaviour – 20m search query terms typed into their AOL 
search engines by 650,000 users over three months. This was a valuable resource for 
research, and AOL was trying to be public spirited by making the release. The data 
were  anonymised,  with  unique  identifiers  (randomly  chosen  numbers)  replacing 
identifiers such as the AOL username, or the IP address of the user‘s computer. The 
reason  identifiers were  provided at  all was  so  that researchers  could  correlate the 
different search terms used by the same individual, without their being able to find out 
who that individual was. 
However,  search  terms  themselves  are  very  identifying.  Many  of  us,  possibly  for 
reputation management, possibly out of Narcissism, search for ourselves on the Web. 
If someone searches for ―Ichabod Thrusthaven‖ more than a couple of times over a 
three month period, then, if the person concerned is not particularly famous, it is a fair 
bet that the searcher is Ichabod Thrusthaven himself. His entire search history – all the 
information he has attempted to find out from the Web – is then laid bare. This may 
include  medical  information,  information  about  sexual  services,  information  about UNCLASSIFIED 





political or religious groups and other types of information that is deeply personal. In 
the AOL case, certain individuals were identified from the data release (Anderson 
2008, 295, Ohm 2010). 
4.1.4  Data and their use 
There have been some responses to this issue – for example, the development of the 
notion of k-anonymity, in which someone is k-anonymous in an anonymised dataset if 
the  data  about  them  is  indistinguishable  from  at  least  k-1  others  in  the  dataset 
(Sweeney  2002).  In  other  words,  there  is  a  group  of  k  indistinguishable  people 
containing the data subject in the dataset at the minimum. To anonymise a dataset 
using  k-anonymity,  the  data  controller  needs  to  delete  or  suppress  the  minimum 
amount of information that will ensure that everyone in the dataset melts into a group 
of k or more people. 
However,  even  k-anonymity  can  be  attacked,  and  is  particularly  vulnerable  when 
background knowledge can be brought to the deanonymisation effort, and when the 
sensitive  values  in  a  group  of  people  lack  diversity.  As  an  example  of  lack  of 
diversity,  suppose  the  sensitive  attributes  are  health  status  and  sexuality  (in  other 
words, we are keen to ensure that information about health and sexuality does not leak 
out). And suppose that a person is made k-anonymous, and is indistinguishable in the 
anonymised dataset from k-1 other people. However, if all or most of the people in 
that group of k have similar health status or sexuality – so there is little diversity in the 
sensitive values of health and sexuality across the group – then it will be easier for the 
adversary to undo the anonymisation and discover the sensitive information. 
This kind of approach assumes that it is possible to make a clear distinction between 
identifying and non-identifying data, whereas actually the difference is made by the 
use to which data are put. In an era of scarce data, the distinction between identifying 
and non-identifying data may have made some de facto sense, but now there are very 
rich sources of information about several aspects of the lives and interests of very 
many  individuals,  any  data  that  distinguishes  one  from  one‘s  fellows  can  be 
identifying. The list of identifying or quasi-identifying attributes cannot be fixed in 
advance. Some attributes are identifying in their own right – the name, to take an 
obvious  example,  or  various  biometrics  –  but  any  attribute,  in  combination  with 
others, can be identifying. 
4.2  Jigsaw identification 
Hence, many databases do contain the materials for an identification of data subjects, 
if  supplemented  by  fairly  straightforward  information  from  sources  such  as  the 
electoral  roll, or local  knowledge.  If the  adversary  has  access  to rich information 
resources, then the problem of so-called jigsaw identification escalates dramatically. 
A number of coups de theâtre by academics and privacy activists in recent years has 
left this beyond doubt. 
Note the obvious point that almost  everyone in practice does  have access  to  rich 
information  resources  via  the  Web.  Transparency  will  contribute  powerful  sets  of 
government data to the mix. This section will briefly review the ways in which data 
can be deanonymised. UNCLASSIFIED 





4.2.1  Identification with supplementary information: the example of 
the Netflix Prize 
In 2006, the online DVD rental company Netflix released data about 500,000 of its 
users‘ movie recommendations. The company sponsored a $1m prize to be won by 
anyone  who  could  take  the  test  data,  and  come  up  with  an  automatic  movie 
recommendation algorithm (i.e. ‗if you liked film X, you may like films Y and Z‘) 
that outperformed its own by 10%. The data were anonymised, and some of the data 
perturbed to inject noise (however, there was not very much noise in the data – too 
much  noise  would  have  made  it  hard  for  researchers  to  create  and  test  a 
recommendation  algorithm).  However,  two  researchers  based  in  the  United  States 
took a very short time to reidentify people in the dataset (Narayanan & Shmatikov 
2008); the lack of noise in the system made this simpler, but their reidentification 
algorithm could have coped with far more noise than Netflix were able to add. 
The following discussion of privacy appeared in the FAQs for the Netflix Prize. 
Q. Is there any customer information in the dataset that should be kept private? 
A. No, all customer identifying information has been removed; all that remains 
are ratings and dates. This follows our privacy policy … Even if, for example, 
you knew all your own ratings and their dates you probably couldn‘t identify 
them reliably in the data because only a small sample was included (less than 
one tenth of our complete dataset) and that data was subject to perturbation. Of 
course, since you know all your own ratings that really isn‘t a privacy problem 
is it? 
Narayanan and Shmatikov showed that identification from the dataset was remarkably 
straightforward, and that the amount of auxiliary information needed was not great. 
Our  conclusion  is  that  very  little  auxiliary  information  is  needed  [to]  de-
anonymize an average subscriber record from the Netflix Prize dataset. With 8 
movie ratings (of which 2 may be completely wrong) and dates that may have a 
14-day error, 99% of records can be uniquely identified in the dataset. For 68%, 
two ratings and dates (with a 3-day error) are sufficient …. Even for the other 
32%, the number of possible candidates is brought down dramatically. … 
Even without any dates, a substantial privacy breach occurs, especially when 
the auxiliary information consists of movies that are not blockbusters. 
Where would the auxiliary information come from? 
Given how little auxiliary information is needed to de-anonymize the average 
subscriber record from the Netflix Prize dataset, a determined adversary who 
targets a specific individual may not find it difficult to obtain such information, 
especially since it need not be precise. We emphasize that massive collection of 
data on thousands of subscribers is not the only or even the most important 
threat.  A  water-cooler  conversation  with  an  office  colleague  about  her 
cinematographic likes and dislikes may yield enough information, especially if 
at  least  a  few  of  the  movies  mentioned  are  outside  the  top  100  most  rated 
Netflix  movies.  This  information  can  also  be  gleaned  from  personal  blogs, 
Google searches, and so on. 
Narayanan and Shmatikov also exploited other online movie rating resources, such as 
the Internet Movie Database. The IMDb is a public arena for discussion of films, UNCLASSIFIED 





where people are happy to disclose their opinions (usually but not always under a 
pseudonym). It should be noted that IMDb discourages crawling its site, although an 
adversary would not be picky about sticking to its terms and conditions. However that 
may be: 
Given a user‘s public IMDb ratings, which the user posted voluntarily to reveal 
some of his (or her; but we‘ll use the male pronoun without loss of generality) 
movie likes and dislikes, we discover all ratings that he entered privately into 
the Netflix system. Why would someone who rates movies on IMDb—often 
under his or her real name—care about privacy of his Netflix ratings? Consider 
the information that we have been able to deduce by locating one of these users‘ 
entire movie viewing history in the Netflix Prize dataset and that  cannot be 
deduced from his public IMDb ratings. 
First,  his  political  orientation may  be revealed  by his strong opinions  about 
―Power and Terror: Noam Chomsky in Our Times‖ and ―Fahrenheit 9/11,‖ and 
his religious views by his ratings on ―Jesus of Nazareth‖ and ―The Gospel of 
John.‖ Even though one should not make inferences solely  from someone‘s 
movie  preferences,  in  many  workplaces  and  social  settings  opinions  about 
movies with predominantly gay themes such as ―Bent‖ and ―Queer as folk‖ 
(both present and rated in this person‘s Netflix record) would be considered 
sensitive. In any case, it  should be for the individual and not for Netflix to 
decide whether to reveal them publicly. 
The  analyses  that  Narayanan  and  Shmatikov  anticipate  are  not  guaranteed  to  be 
accurate. They are statistically-based, and so will have a built-in likelihood of error. 
They are also computationally very expensive. Nevertheless, they work. 
Incredibly, however, Netflix persevered with its prize – won in 2009 by researchers at 
AT&T Labs – and because the prize was ―such a research and business hit‖ (Lohr 
2010) it immediately announced plans for another one. Only in March 2010 was the 
idea called off, in the face of privacy concerns, a lawsuit and the attentions of the 
Federal  Trade  Commission  (Lohr  2010).  Clearly  the  threats  to  privacy  from 
deanonymisation remain poorly-understood outside the laboratory – perhaps partly 
because of the difficulty of the mathematics and statistics involved, but also because 
of  a  faith  in  the  power  of  anonymisation  that  is  beginning  to  look  somewhat 
Pollyannaish. What the Netflix affair shows is that the simple distinction between 
identifying  and  non-identifying  data  is  not  sustainable,  and  should  not  be  taken 
seriously by anyone with a genuine concern for privacy. 
4.2.2  Techniques 
The techniques used in this area trade on the fact that even supposedly non-identifying 
things about oneself are often unique or nearly unique. The clothes I wear today, the 
food I have eaten this week, the shopping I have done, the mileage I have driven, the 
places I have visited, the trains I have caught, the television I have watched – any of 
these mundane pieces of information could supply the key to my identity to someone 
who  had  access  to  sufficient  background  information.  And  if  we  are  genuinely 
worried about privacy, then we cannot make the comforting assumption, especially in 
this over-wired world, that that background information will not, or only rarely, be 
available. Indeed, if a particular person was being targeted, the chances would rise UNCLASSIFIED 





dramatically that the information would be available, as blogs, tweets and Facebook 
pages are incredibly rich sources provided by data subjects themselves. 
Not only that, but the quantity of information available simply grows and grows. The 
Web doesn‘t shrink (by much, anyway). We should assume that if information has 
once reached the Web, the chances are overwhelming that it will stay there, in some 
form or another, for quite some time. Hence even if the background information about 
some people was too small to be of value to an adversary at one point in time, we 
cannot assume that that will remain true over time. Conversely, if at any point there is 
sufficient background information about someone, that will remain so in the future. 
The technique is very simple: given an anonymised database, and some auxiliary data, 
the adversary matches up lines which have attributes in common, as shown below. 
Suppose we have a line of data of the following form: 
Attribute A  Attribute B  Attribute C  Attribute D  Attribute E 
Value a  Value b  Value c  Value d  Value e 
And a line of data of the following form comes into our possession: 
Attribute C  Attribute D  Attribute E  Attribute F  Attribute G 
Value c  Value d  Value e  Value f  Value g 
If the conjunction of c, d and e is a quasi-identifier, then we can join the two lines of 
data to get the following amalgamated, and much more informative, line. 
Attribute A  Attribute B  Attribute C  Attribute D  Attribute E  Attribute F  Attribute G 
Value a  Value b  Value c  Value d  Value e  Value f  Value g 
So, for example, in the Netflix data, if we take three obscure movies which some 
users have rated, and match them with the ratings given to those films by reviewers in 
the IMDb, then if we find a match between the two datasets, we can infer that the two 
lines of data are actually about the same person. 
Using  such  techniques,  databases  can  be  linked  together,  joining  them  where  a 
particular set of characteristics match. As noted, these techniques are hardly  exact, 
and a join can only be made with a degree of probability that it is correct, but the 
inferences can be made with some measure of confidence (even if an inference is 
incorrect, this may not be of any comfort to someone who is falsely accused of doing 
something). 
Data that are innocuous in isolation can be devastating in conjunction. For instance, 
suppose one database contained the following row: 
Gender  Postcode  Children  Driver  Reference 
F  SO17  2  No  Dr P. Mason 
And another included: 
Age  Sex  Address  Smoker  Registered 
GP 
15  Female  Southampton  No  Dr P. Mason 
Joining the two databases would allow us to create a more complete row of data 
which suddenly has more significance. If we could be reasonably sure that the same UNCLASSIFIED 





person was the subject of these two rows, a female resident of Southampton who has 
given the name of her GP as a referee in some transaction or another, that would tell 
us that the 15-year-old child of the second database was the mother-of-two of the first. 
Another useful source of information is the structure of social networks. Narayanan 
and Shmatikov (2009) presented a framework for analysing privacy and anonymity in 
social  networks  with  a  re-identification  algorithm  targeting  anonymised  social 
network graphs (i.e. the basic structure of who follows whom, or who is friends with 
whom, without information about who these people are – information that is often 
shared). Their algorithm is robust to noise perturbation and other defences, and works 
even when the adversary doesn‘t have a great deal of auxiliary information. They 
showed that a third of the users who can be verified to have accounts on both Twitter 
and Flickr can be re-identified in the anonymous Twitter graph with only a 12% error 
rate. 
4.2.3  Impossibility theorems 
The results presented intuitively in the previous section have been given mathematical 
expression in a number of powerful theorems showing the impossibility of achieving 
privacy  while  maintaining  a  given  level  of  practical  utility.  The  problem  is  that 
auxiliary information can always be brought to the calculation (cf. Dwork 2006). 
Of  course,  to  formulate  mathematical  theorems  to  show  what  is  and  what  is  not 
theoretically possible, mathematical definitions of the relevant concepts are required. 
One  useful  idea  is  that  a  database  protects  privacy  if  the  adversary  cannot  learn 
anything  about  an  individual  from  the  database  which  he  could  not  have  learned 
without  access  (Dalenius  1977).  Utility  is  very  intuitively  associated  with  the 
unpredictability of the output of the database as communicated to the user; if the user 
knew in advance what answers the database would give, then the database would not 
be very useful. The utility is also associated with the number of correct answers to 
queries that the database will give out; hence if we restrict the output of the database 
to protect privacy, its utility will be restricted proportionately. 
If the adversary is allowed to bring auxiliary information to the table, then he can 
learn things that he should not be able to learn. If, say, the database is not supposed to 
give out personal data, but tells us something very bland and non-personal such as the 
average salary of a person working for a particular company, and the adversary knows 
that X works for that company and earns more than the average salary, then he is 
already able to narrow the range for X‘s salary. If he knows something more precise 
about X (say that she earns 50% more than the average salary), then he can calculate 
her salary more accurately. Indeed, suppose X did not work for the company, but that 
the  adversary  knew  that  she  earned  50%  more  than  the  average  salary  for  that 
company; in that case the adversary could work out X‘s salary even though she does 
not appear in the database at all. 
This is of course an intuitive expression of what turns out to be a fairly complex 
mathematical idea, but a formal, mathematical expression can be found in (Dwork 
2006) and elsewhere. UNCLASSIFIED 





4.2.4  The legal repercussions 
The legal repercussions of this work could be very large.  Ohm has argued that it 
makes the EU directive far too wide for any practical purpose. Virtually anything will 
be illegal because 
… anonymization makes laws like the EU Data Protection Directive overbroad, 
in  fact  essentially  boundless.  Because  the  Directive  turns  on  whether 
information  is  ―directly  or  indirectly‖  linked  to  a  person,  each  successful 
reidentification of a supposedly anonymized database extends the regulation to 
cover that database. As reidentification science advances, it expands the EU 
Directive like an ideal gas to fit the shape of its container. A law that was meant 
to  have  limits  is  rendered  limitless.  A  careful  balance  struck  by  legislators 
between privacy and information flow shifts wildly to impose data handling 
requirements to all data in all situations. (Ohm 2010) 
In  other  words,  the  directive  applies  to  everything,  because  someone  could  be 
identified from any piece of data of which he is the subject, even if anonymised. 
Nevertheless,  powerful  though  Ohm‘s  reasoning  is,  I  am  not  convinced  that  this 
sweeping conclusion is necessarily the case – there is I would suggest some leeway in 
the  directive‘s  phrasing:  ―one  who  can  be  identified,  directly  or  indirectly,  in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific 
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity‖. As Ohm 
points out, indirect identification is included, but there is a question about whether, 
say, one‘s film preferences, as recorded by Netflix, or even one‘s search query terms 
as recorded by AOL, count as matters specific to someone‘s identity in the words of 
the directive, at the point of data release. 
Furthermore, the Data Protection Act 1998, which implements the EU Directive, is 
much narrower, referring to personal data as ―data which relate to a living individual 
who  can  be  identified  from  those  data  and  other  information  which  is  in  the 
possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller.‖ Hence if 
we take Ohm‘s arguments about deanonymisation and the directive on board (and cf. 
also Crossman et al 2007, 120-121), it begins to look like the EU Directive forbids the 
release of almost everything, while the UK Act, which supposedly implements it, will 
allow rampant reidentification! 
Thirdly,  the  deanonymisation  issue  means  that  virtually  everything  is  tagged  as 
potentially dangerous. Suppose a number of datasets need to be plundered before a 
particular individual X is identified with a reasonable level of certainty. How does the 
law stand with respect to these? Are all the data releases culpable? Or is it just the last 
one, which was, as it were, the straw which broke the identity camel‘s back? After all, 
all the other datasets were released into a world in which the auxiliary information 
required to make the identification was not generally available. Or was it the last 
dataset which came into the possession of the adversary, which may not have been the 
last one released? These really do appear to be open questions. 
I think it more likely that UK law will allow data releases that Ohm would believe to 
be reckless. The issue then is where to draw the line – and in my view, given the 
importance of technical advances here, it will be very hard to encode a sensible view 
of what is a ‗safe‘ release of data into either technical, computational, statistical or 
legal instruments. UNCLASSIFIED 





4.2.5  Responsibility 
If Ohm‘s argument, that total responsibility must be distributed widely, doesn‘t stand, 
it is important to thrash out where responsibility for a data breach would lie in the 
event that a jigsaw identification did occur. There are a number of possibilities, none 
of which is very satisfactory. 
Perhaps the most obvious candidate would be the provider of the final piece of the 
jigsaw  that  enabled  the  identification  to  take  place.  Yet  this  surely  suggests  an 
extremely onerous duty on anyone releasing anonymised data into the public domain, 
without  powers  to  control  access:  that  they  should  ensure  that  no-one  can  be 
identified, in tandem with the information context, from the data. This would be a 
Sisyphean  task,  and  would  have  a  terribly  chilling  effect  on  transparency. 
Furthermore,  it  would  be  very  unfortunate  if,  say,  indiscreet  postings  on  social 
networking  sites  by  data  subjects  were  to  prevent  the  orderly  release  of  valuable 
government datasets, because the probability of identification of those subjects, given 
the auxiliary information they themselves had made available on the social network, 
was too high. 
Yet  the  order  in  which  the  pieces  of  the  jigsaw  are  made  available  does  seem 
important, even when some of the most telling pieces are released early on in the 
process. This is a particularly complex issue to resolve, especially as there are two 
relevant classes of responsibility, the legal and the political, to be taken account of. It 
may be that the sheer complexity of the analysis required to deanonymise will protect 
those  hoping  to  release  valuable  datasets,  by  rendering  deanonymisation  of  any 
carefully-anonymised particular dataset unlikely. 
4.2.6  Empirical evidence 
Empirical evidence is lacking in this area. Many issues of data protection turn upon 
the effort required for a privacy breach, and the likelihood of that occurring. We know 
that deanonymisation is  a real  possibility  – mathematically from the impossibility 
theorems, and in practice from the deanonymisation of the AOL data, performed, in 
Ohm‘s phrase, by ―a small group of bored bloggers.‖ Ohm makes the point that this is 
not just a theoretical possibility; we cannot simply ignore the issue on the ground that 
only a super-adversary could possibly marshal enough computing skill. 
It is certainly true that deanonymisation requires a lot of skill and resources. However, 
the costs can be amortized or written off over time as it needs only be done once and 
yet  could  provide  sensitive  details  of  thousands  or  even  millions  of  individuals 
(Narayanan & Shmatikov 2010), while the more information that is revealed about a 
person,  either  via  legitimate  data  releases  or  by  deanonymisation  of  anonymised 
databases, the easier it is to expose that person elsewhere in the future (Ohm 2010). 
Furthermore, Moore‘s Law means that more computing power is available over time 
(the amount of power per chip doubles every 18 months). If we map this technology 
development cycle onto Britain‘s electoral cycle, this means that a technology that is 
feasible at the beginning of a Parliament, and whose benefits are monetisable, will be 
in routine use by the end of it. 
Nevertheless, we do lack good empirical evidence about how data will be used in the 
real world. Bringing databases built on different principles together is a hard problem 
(Garfinkel 2008, Cavoukian & El Emam 2011), and data scraped off the Web by 
criminally-minded  adversaries  might  well  be  harder  to  deal  with  than  the  well-UNCLASSIFIED 





structured datasets released by AOL and Netflix. Furthermore, there may also be a 
difference  in  capabilities  between  well-funded  and  highly-qualified  academic 
researchers and their teams of assistants, and the resources available to real-world 
adversaries. The small number of empirical studies there have been seem to confirm 
the difficulty of the problem (Lafky 2009), but the work must be ongoing because of 
the advantage that the continuing relevance of Moore‘s Law gives to the adversary. It 
is important to address this lack of evidence somehow, a point to which I shall return 
in my recommendations below. 
4.2.7  Data integrity 
Recall from section 3.1.4 the importance of retaining the integrity of data through any 
transparency procedure; if releasing data caused problems in the data, or made the use 
of the data more problematic, then a rethink may be needed. In certain circumstances, 
the release of anonymised data could present a problem for legitimate data users. 
For instance, it may be that a publicly available dataset could be used to identify data 
subjects in combination with other datasets that are available to accredited researchers 
under  controlled  conditions.  Of  course,  this  would  not  present  a  serious  privacy 
problem, because government agencies have a range of constraints and sanctions that 
they can apply, if need be, to trusted and accredited researchers (and  no-one else 
would have access). Hence data subjects are extremely unlikely to be identified via 
this route, because there will still be several methods in place to prevent or deter 
identification. 
However,  if  data  subjects  remain  identifiable,  the  problem  for  researchers  may 
remain, because their access to the restricted datasets could be affected by a new-
found  and  unwanted  ability  to  identify  some  data  subjects.  It  may  also  present  a 
problem for providers, as (particularly with sensitive data such as health or education 
data)  they  may  find  themselves  with  more  stringent  requirements  under  the  Data 
Protection Act. Even suppliers of raw data (such as GPs or schools) may be more 
reluctant to continue to provide such data where they are under no statutory obligation 
to do so, if they begin to judge that the burden of their responsibilities and liabilities is 
higher than they wish to bear. 
The  solution  to  this  issue  is  easy  enough;  engage  with  data  users  to  ensure  that 
anonymisation of publicly-available datasets is sufficient to maintain the anonymity 
of data subjects across the range of data releases, including those datasets to which 
access is restricted and controlled. Both data providers and data users need to be 
satisfied that no-one is identifiable from the data provided. 
4.2.8  Let’s not say ‘anonymise’ 
It is essential that policymakers, data managers, data controllers, privacy officers and 
lawyers  do  not  automatically  assume  that  ‗anonymised‘  data  cannot  be  used  to 
reidentify people. This is a semantic and legal  fiction which could not have been 
propagated without the estrangement between legal and technical practitioners which 
I discussed in section 1.2.4. As noted there, legal discourse alone is not sufficient to 
address this problem. 
Following Sweeney, Ohm suggests, not unreasonably, that the term ‗anonymise‘ be 
removed from the legal vocabulary. Its use implies that data have been placed in a 
state wherein an individual cannot be identified even after some manipulation. This is UNCLASSIFIED 





now in some dispute to say the least, and so the term – an achievement word – should 
be  replaced  by  one  that  connotes  effort  without  necessarily  guaranteed  success. 
Sweeney likes ‗deidentify‘, Ohm prefers ‗scrub‘. My own favourite, for what it is 
worth, is ‗disguise‘. Someone can attempt to conceal their identity with a disguise, but 
that does  not  imply that they cannot  be identified despite the disguise; Superman 
disguises himself as Clark Kent, but his identity is still blindingly obvious to everyone 
except the characters in the show. At the moment there is little consensus about this, 
so in this report I have and will continue to use the unsatisfactory terms ‗anonymise‘ 
and ‗deanonymise‘. 
The key point to emphasise is that there are no cast-iron guarantees in this space, and 
we shouldn‘t continue to pretend there are. One plausible reading of the Directive 
(―one who can be identified‖) is that without such guarantees we have to consider data 
to be personal data. As (Cavoukian & El Emam 2011) point out in the context of 
health data, that would have a chilling effect on the sharing of valuable data. 
And  it  should  be  emphasised  that  just  because  anonymisation  techniques  are 
susceptible  to  jigsaw  identification,  it  does  not  follow  that  we  should  stop 
anonymising (Cavoukian & El Emam 2011), any more than we should stop using 
burglar alarms to protect our homes even though they are ineffective against the most 
skilled  burglars.  Even  if  they  are  susceptible  to  attack,  they  make  the  task  of 
identifying  individuals  very  much  harder.  And  if  the  sharing  of  anonymised  data 
became as legally and administratively burdensome as the sharing of personal data 
now  is,  then  the  incentives  for  anonymising  would  evaporate.  However,  the 
possibility that data can be deanonymised, combined with the great uncertainty about 
how difficult a problem that would be, does need to be factored into our discussion 
about whether data can be released into the public arena. 
4.3  Alternative approaches 
It is important to recognise that it would be a terrible defeat if it became impossible to 
publish useful datasets because of deanonymisation. Commentators on this issue do 
have potential solutions to the problem, but there is a problem in squaring them with 
the  demands  of  a  transparency  programme.  I  shall  discuss  these  matters  in  this 
section. 
4.3.1  Disclosure control 
The  first  broad  class  of  methods  to  protect  privacy  is  what  is  called  ‗disclosure 
control‘ (cf. Anderson 2008, 275-311). Under disclosure control, also known as query 
control, the data controller interacts with those querying the dataset, and prevents 
privacy-threatening queries being answered. As Narayanan and Shmatikov point out, 
―this can be a hard pill to swallow, because [disclosure control] requires designing a 
programming interface for queries, budgeting for server resources, performing regular 
audits, and so forth‖ (2010, 26). 
Broadly speaking, the idea of disclosure control is to screen queries of the data for a 
set of queries that between them will reveal a sensitive statistic. For instance, if I want 
to know X‘s salary, I might query a database for the average salary of everyone in the 
database, and query for the average salary of everyone but X. Guarding against this 
can become computationally very intensive. UNCLASSIFIED 





The  problem  with  disclosure  control  in  the  context  of  privacy  is  obvious:  the 
philosophy of transparency views data as public property, and advocates open, free 
and unrestricted use of released data, including allowing passing those data to other 
people. Furthermore, one of the aims of the UK transparency programme is to avoid a 
heavy bureaucratic overhead in order to facilitate the publication of as much data as 
possible without departments or agencies incurring large costs. Hence the whole idea 
of disclosure control as a routine means of protecting privacy is simply incompatible 
with transparency. The lower the overhead that disclosure control imposes on the data 
release process,  the better, but  in  a context  where the  aim is  to  allow citizens  to 
download data on open licences with as few obstacles as possible, then disclosure 
control  is  clearly  very  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  transparency.  Indeed  a  tightly 
controlling mechanism is relatively difficult to implement whenever a large number of 
queries is anticipated; a tough disclosure control regime would be something of a 
bottleneck. 
That does not mean of course that transparency is necessarily threatening to privacy. 
It does mean that the use of one powerful but expensive mechanism is denied to any 
transparency programme in which privacy is respected. 
Compare  the  situation  with  transparency  as  defined  here,  with  that  described  by 
(Cavoukian & El Emam 2011), who argue for the continued practice of anonymising 
and sharing health data. Cavoukian and El Emam‘s assumption that deanonymisation 
will be hard is boosted by the fact that health data will only be shared with vetted and 
trusted third parties. This means that the third parties are accountable, and the data 
sharer can be very much more confident that adversaries prepared and equipped to 
deanonymise will not get their hands on the data. This strengthens Cavoukian‘s case, 
but her powerful argument depends on supplementing anonymisation with disclosure 
controls. This is not an option for a transparency programme  in the scope of this 
report. 
4.3.2  Administrative mechanisms 
Similar arguments apply to the use of administrative mechanisms such as consent, 
terms and conditions, registration and  charging. These do have lower bureaucratic 
overheads, and would allow the government to get around data protection constraints 
– if consent is gained for the release of data by data subjects, then data controllers 
have a much freer hand, even if (as noted in section 3.1.5) consent at the moment is a 
very unsatisfactory mechanism from the point of view of empowering the citizen. 
Consent means getting the agreement of the data subject for the data to be used for a 
wider  set  of  purposes  than  the  immediate  purpose  of  collection.  With  terms  and 
conditions, the person downloading the government data from the Web (the user) 
would  have  to  tick  a  box  to  agree  to  a  set  of  terms,  which  could  include,  e.g. 
restrictions on the uses to which the data are put, constraints on who the user can pass 
the data onto, or a prohibition on the user allowing the data to be transferred, either by 
himself or by a third party, outside the OECD (or jurisdictions where data protection 
law was well-policed and governed by international agreements). 
A registration system would require a user to register and identify himself before 
getting  access  to  the  data.  Then  if  data  were  misused,  there  would  be  at  least  a 
possibility that he could be traced and sanctions placed upon him (the deterrent effect 
may only be small, but would at least be non-zero). In the event that a particular set of UNCLASSIFIED 





data was released on a regular basis (such as the crime data, for example, which at the 
time of writing are released monthly), then the government could run a regular feed 
service where registered users could receive the up-to-date data automatically upon 
their release. If the government then discovered that information was being misused 
by a particular user, then  he could  be deleted from the regular feed, or from  the 
registration entirely. 
A charging system is obvious: the government simply charges a small fee for access 
to  the  data,  which  would  add  to  the  costs  of  those  planning  to  use  the  data  to 
compromise privacy, and would alter the economics of any criminal or anti-social 
usage. 
These  mechanisms  are  crude  and  not  too  easy  to  enforce,  and  do  impose  a 
bureaucratic cost, both on the government to run schemes like this, and on the users 
who would have to comply with them. They also raise the barriers to entry for new 
information entrepreneurs to enter the market. The quality of the data could also be 
compromised in the event that, say, only a few data subjects gave informed consent. 
Hence they are not very compatible with the transparency programme, and should not 
be viewed as a useful general purpose tool in this space. 
However, it should be remarked that the costs of such schemes are not enormous. It 
might be the case that in some circumstances, the government could consider using 
such schemes for potentially sensitive data that it wished to make available. I did 
suggest in my interim report on the crime data that exploration of a consent-based 
system, in which some victims of crime could agree to having geographical data about 
the crimes of which they were victim being given without being made deliberately 
vague,  would  be  a  good  idea  –  although,  because  of  the  bureaucratic  overhead 
involved, I did not recommend that such a system should definitely be used. 
One could imagine their use in some circumstances, including: 
  Where there were some identifiable risks from releasing the data. 
  Where the data were not obviously sensitive in the abstract, so the opportunity 
from  a  data  release  was  of  greater  moment  than  the  threat.  Sensitivity  of 
course depends a great deal on context, and the use of an informed consent 
mechanism  would  allow  the  data  subject  a  say  on  data  that  might  not 
otherwise be released. 
  Where government departments and agencies could be confident that the costs 
to them would be made up by wider economic benefits. 
  Where there was keenly-expressed demand and a willing user base for the 
data. 
  Where there was evidence that there would be many information entrepreneurs 
willing to compete against each other to provide information services using the 
data, so it was known that the barriers to entry to the market were not high 
enough to deplete competition. 
  Where the generation of the data by the government department or agency 
demanded  substantial  investment,  thereby  increasing  the  desirability  of 
creating an income stream. UNCLASSIFIED 





In short, bureaucratic access control systems can be of value when (a) having them in 
place makes a data release possible where it would not otherwise be possible (which 
might  be  for  privacy  reasons,  or  other  reasons  such  as  cost),  or  when  (b) their 
presence would have a positive effect on the quality of the data being released. 
In such circumstances, then one could imagine one or more of these methods having 
some value. However, at the moment, there would seem to be no particular reason to 
explore these ideas, as there are plenty of datasets of very little risk indeed which 
could be released without compromising privacy at all. They are worth bearing in 
mind,  however,  for  future  releases,  especially  as  the  transparency  programme 
becomes more demand-driven. 
Hence access control systems are unlikely to be part of the model of transparency in 
the general case, but they could add value in certain areas, in particular by allowing 
some privacy concerns to be allayed. Which of the methods – consent, terms and 
conditions, registration and charging – would be suitable in what combination would 
depend on the sustainability model for a particular data release. Who should bear the 
costs? Is the demand for the data sufficiently great that cost is not an issue? Who 
should administer the bureaucratic workload? Is access control compatible with low 
barriers to entry? How should competition be fostered? And of course what is the 
threat, if any, to privacy? All of these issues would need to be addressed in each 
particular case. 
4.3.3  Differential privacy 
Recall the impossibility theorem of section 4.2.3. It says, in effect, that the possibility 
that something can be learned about one from a database cannot be reduced to zero. 
This conundrum has led to an alternative mathematical definition of privacy, which 
states,  broadly  speaking,  that  the  risk  to  one‘s  privacy  should  not  substantially 
increase as a result of one‘s appearing in a statistical database. This notion has been 
called differential privacy (Dwork 2008). 
Note that differential privacy is a relative, non-absolute notion. There are no cast-iron 
guarantees – this informal characterisation relies on notions of risk, which is not to be 
‗substantially‘ increased. Of course, what counts as a ‗substantial‘ risk may differ 
depending on whose beholder the eye belongs to, on changing social mores, and on 
the  public  good  of  increasing  the  utility  of  a  released  database.  Nevertheless,  the 
privacy guarantee from differential privacy is still very strong because it is a statistical 
property; once the appropriate level of risk has been decided on (a social question), 
the risk can be maintained independently of both the computational power and the 
auxiliary information that the adversary is able to throw at the problem. In effect, it is 
a concept that judges the computation as privacy-preserving or otherwise, rather than 
trying  to  make  an  impossible  distinction  between  identifying  and  non-identifying 
data. It also implies that, even if a privacy breach does occur, the data subject can be 
assured  that  it  was  not  the  presence  of  her  data  on  the  database  that  caused  the 
problem. 
Differential privacy makes an important contribution to the field. However, once more 
a problem with it is that, so far as we know, to be exploited, it requires the controller 
of a dataset to retain control and to administer the access granted to outsiders. Control 
using  this  methodology  involves  monitoring  queries  via  a  special  language,  the 
Privacy Integrated Query Language (PINQ – McSherry 2010), to produce a precise UNCLASSIFIED 





statement of the privacy that has been revealed as a result of its associated theory 
quantifying  privacy  revelation.  The  database  itself  must  be  protected  in  order  to 
monitor queries. 
An important advantage of the exploitation of differential privacy is that it allows 
setting a level of privacy compromise which is tolerable. This of course is a political 
decision, not a technocratic decision, to make it larger or smaller. However, once it 
has been set, the use of PINQ allows a precise specification of how far a set of queries 
has approached the limit. 
The major disadvantage for the method is that, once the limit has been reached, the 
dataset is finished; once the privacy ‗budget‘ has been expended, the dataset cannot be 
exploited  further  without  threatening  privacy  beyond  the  limits  originally  set.  Of 
course, in such circumstances, there will also be a political threat that those wanting to 
extract further utility from the data will apply pressure to raise the privacy limit as it is 
approached. To avert this the controller of a dataset must retain control and must be 
resistant to pressure from those wishing to exploit the data beyond the limit (who 
may, of course, include the controller‘s bosses). 
However,  that  is  not  to  say  that  differential  privacy  could  not  have  a  role  in  the 
context of transparency. Differential privacy is underpinned by a theory that (a) is 
rigorous, and (b) defines ‗non-identifying‘ on the basis of what might be done with 
the data, in addition to the properties of the data. This means that it might well have 
an important role to play in estimating the dangers to privacy of a particular data 
release, and giving what we might call a ‗privacy baseline‘ against which to judge the 
feasibility of release. 
The theory may also become more practicable as it becomes linked to other notions of 
privacy. For example, an early result has appeared in ArXiv (Li et al 2011) that in 
effect analyses the flaws in k-anonymity, and then supplements it with a more relaxed 
notion of differential privacy to provide improved privacy guarantees from ‗hiding in 
a crowd of k people‘. It is too early to tell whether this approach is the way forward in 
this area, but the paper certainly indicates that privacy and transparency advocates 
should watch this space over the next few years. 
4.4  How should we deal with anonymised data? 
Opinions  about  how  we  should  move  forward  differ  very  markedly.  In  this  final 
section, I shall comment broadly on the arguments about anonymisation and other 
data safety mechanisms, and will try to suggest ways to assess and properly manage 
the risks involved. 
4.4.1  The low risk of deanonymisation 
There are clearly risks with the use of anonymised data, but they are relatively low 
and  the  various  potential  solutions  to  the  problem  are  often  too  risk  averse  (for 
instance, using differential privacy will prevent data being used by all but very trusted 
and accredited researchers). We should beware of throwing the transparent baby out 
with the private bathwater. After all, anonymised data have been published for years, 
even  in  sensitive  areas.  Raiseonline  (https://www.raiseonline.org/Login.aspx) 
provides interactive analysis of school and pupil performance data, extracted from the 
National  Pupil  Database,  while  the  Secondary  Uses  Service  (SUS  – 
http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/sus)  provides UNCLASSIFIED 





comprehensive data on health service outcomes. Services like these have served vital 
public purposes, and also have helped generate best practice in this area, although 
SUS in particular has occasionally been the subject of some controversy (e.g. Brown 
et al 2010). 
In  an  interesting  riposte  to  Ohm,  Ann  Cavoukian,  the  Information  and  Privacy 
Commissioner  of  Ontario,  has  argued  that  ―the  claim  that  the  de-identification  of 
personal  data  has  no  value  and  does  not  protect  privacy  due  to  the  ease  of  re-
identification is a myth‖ (Cavoukian & El Emam 2011). 
Cavoukian and El Emam base their argument around three claims that are important 
correctives to the argument made by Ohm. First, they point out that anonymisation 
remains  a  strong  tool.  It  does  protect  privacy,  of  course  –  anonymised  data  are 
certainly more private than the personal data they replace. The steps to deanonymise 
are  not  at  all  trivial;  so  far  most  of  the  more  sensational  results  have  been 
demonstrated  by  highly  motivated,  well-resourced  and  well-trained  researchers. 
Hence the anonymisation of personal  data clearly puts  a barrier between the data 
subject and those who would misuse the data about them. As an analogy, just because 
some burglars are capable of neutralising burglar alarms, that does not mean that we 
should  stop  using  them  to  protect  our  houses.  Their  protective  value  may  not  be 
100%, but it still outweighs their cost. Similarly with anonymisation. 
Secondly, they argue that deanonymisation is not just a tricky step for the adversary; it 
is an enormous barrier. The empirical evidence, such as it is, shows that even experts 
struggle to deanonymise datasets. It is also a very costly procedure, which would be 
beyond the reach of many. 
Thirdly,  they  point  out  that  if  the  argument  of  (Ohm  2010)  is  accepted  without 
reservation, then in effect we would have to treat anonymised data as identifiable, and 
therefore as personal data. Hence the administrative overheads for someone dealing 
with anonymised data would be as extensive as the overheads applying to people 
dealing with personal data (e.g. the need to contact all data subjects every time the 
data were to be used for a reason other than that for which they were collected). This 
would be an intolerable situation, as there would then be no incentive for anyone to 
anonymise anything at all. That would be crippling either to privacy, or to the benefits 
of data sharing. The consequences of Ohm‘s argument go way beyond the potential 
harms he has identified. 
A fourth point which they could have added is that anonymisation techniques are 
becoming  increasingly  sophisticated.  In  contrast,  the  AOL  data  were  anonymised 
using  pretty  basic  techniques.  The  ‗doomsday  scenarios‘  of  widespread  privacy 
breaches as a result of anonymised data sharing have not happened to those datasets 
which were anonymised more carefully (indeed, even the most notorious losses of 
unencrypted personal data have not led to any serious outcome – Kelsey 2009). The 
risk may be non-zero, but it may also be close enough to zero to render it effectively 
negligible. In that case, it would hardly be a sufficient ground to deny ourselves the 
benefits of sharing data and transparency. 
4.4.2  Limits to the optimistic argument 
This is an important corrective to the view of Ohm and others. Cavoukian‘s cogent 
case that anonymisation still has a vital role to play in the preservation of both privacy 
and data-value is absolutely right. However, in the context of transparency as defined UNCLASSIFIED 





in this report, it is also important to understand the limits of her argument. She focuses 
on one particular area of highly sensitive information, personal health information, 
which is very private and has great social value. In this context she is thinking mainly 
of secondary uses such as ―research and evaluation‖, and other ―authorized secondary 
purposes‖. The anonymised data are most likely to fall into unauthorised hands by 
accident or via an opportunistic ―inside job‖ and so ―it is unlikely that the person who 
finds the information would have the motive or capacity to attempt to re-identify the 
individuals in the data set‖. 
Absolutely.  However,  Cavoukian‘s  argument  is  not  conclusive.  The  context  upon 
which she focuses allows a much greater level of control than the transparency with 
which we are concerned in this report. The assumptions she makes do not hold in the 
uncontrolled online context. The data, once online, will remain online, and cannot be 
withdrawn (the data released by AOL in 2006, for example, were withdrawn within 
three days when AOL realised its mistake, and yet they are still widely available). It 
is, as she says, no big deal  if the incompetent or the opportunist can get hold of 
anonymised data, but once they are online the data can be sought out by competent 
and well-resourced adversaries at their leisure. It does not matter if such masterminds 
are rare; they will come to the data, rather than waiting for opportunity to knock. 
Cavoukian makes much of the ―conclusion that the re-identification of individuals is a 
difficult and time-consuming task, on the part of skilled technicians.‖ She is once 
more absolutely correct to do so. However, this is a very grey area – we simply do not 
know exactly how hard a task this is. There is little empirical evidence. But in the 
context that interests us, time is not necessarily a problem for the adversary, because 
the  data  cannot  be  withdrawn  from  circulation  if  they  get  into  unsavoury  hands. 
Neither  is  difficulty  necessarily  a  problem,  because  skilled  researchers  can  be 
recruited and brought to the data on a schedule that suits the adversary. Cavoukian‘s 
argument  assumes  a  window  of  opportunity  that  can  be  closed  if  there  is  an 
unacceptable risk. This is not the case if datasets are published online. 
This consideration also undermines another foundation of Cavoukian‘s argument, that 
the costs of deanonymisation are too great for most adversaries. Again this is probably 
true, though empirical evidence once more is lacking (and organised criminals do 
have access to impressive resources). But in the context of transparency as defined 
here, the costs of deanonymisation can be amortised – that is, written off against the 
potential  benefits  stemming  from  the  large  number  of  identities  that  may  be 
uncovered – and distributed, by selling information on in the many criminal markets 
for stolen identities.  
Furthermore, the science of deanonymisation will no doubt develop, as will the cheap 
computing  power  available  to  an  adversary.  Even  if  an  anonymised  dataset  is 
uncrackable now, it may not be two years hence – and, even if it has been officially 
withdrawn by then, it must be assumed that its Web presence will continue. 
Finally, deanonymisation gets easier as the amount of auxiliary information increases. 
And  of  course  relevant  auxiliary  information  is  increasing  online  all  the  time.  In 
particular, if a government is releasing anonymised data in a sector regularly, then the 
cumulative effect will be to increase the amount of relevant data in that sector over 
time. Each release is not only vulnerable in itself, but it will act as potential auxiliary 
data to crack other datasets in that area. UNCLASSIFIED 





4.4.3  The need to confirm our optimistic intuitions 
Cavoukian‘s  closing  statement  that  ―while  de-identification  may  not  be  a  perfect 
solution to reduce all privacy risks when personal information is being considered for 
secondary purposes, it is an important first step that should be used as part of an 
overall risk assessment framework‖ (Cavoukian & El Emam 2011) correctly draws 
attention both  to  the value and the limitations of anonymisation. The task  of any 
transparency  programme  such  as  that  of  the  United  Kingdom  is  to  craft  the  risk 
assessment procedure in a realistic and conscientious way. I shall address that task in 
the recommendations below. 
The  risk  of  deanonymisation  is  very  low,  but  not  zero.  However,  even  critics  of 
anonymisation admit that the situation is extremely unclear; for example, Narayanan 
has written that ―we need to better understand the theoretical limits of anonymization 
and to extract the common principles underlying the more complex re-identification 
techniques developed in recent years‖ (Narayanan 2009). There are a few examples of 
dramatic deanonymisations in the literature, some of which are reviewed above, but 
they have tended to be of well-structured datasets under optimal conditions. This is a 
tiny percentage of all the anonymised data releases over the years, and the heightened 
awareness  of  the  potential  for  deanonymisation  has  not  led  to  a  flood  of 
deanonymised data. 
It is also important that debates about particular anonymised datasets are properly 
informed,  and  that  (recalling  section  3.4)  we  are  transparent  about  transparency 
practice.  In  order  to  maximise  the  value  of  debate  about  releasing  anonymised 
datasets, it will be important to be open about which anonymisation techniques are 
being used to anonymise datasets (this will not allow the original dataset to be reverse 
engineered, of course), in order to allow realistic and independent assessments about 
risk to be made. 
5  All this is cause for optimism that sophisticated 
anonymisation, perturbation and pseudonymisation 
techniques will continue to allow the release of 
valuable data for use by the public, and the 
management of a negligible risk. However, it is 
important to confirm that intuition with further 
investigative work to show that the risk really is 
negligible – and if it proves not to be, to suggest 
further ways forward. It is not the place of this report 
to ‘solve’ this problem or ‘decide’ the argument one 
way or the other; my aim here is to state the position 
of the debate as it stands, and suggest means by 
which realistic consideration of the issues 
surrounding particular sensitive dataset releases can 
be facilitated.UNCLASSIFIED 





Conclusions and recommendations 
5.1  Introduction 
I  have  reviewed  transparency,  privacy  in  the  context  of  transparency,  and  the 
technological developments that have created so many imponderable problems. The 
general  outline  of  my  recommended  courses  of  action  is  probably  clear  from  the 
discussion; we need better institutions and conversations to screen data for the privacy 
implications  of  their  release,  and  we  need  to  include  technologists  in  these 
conversations to a much greater degree than has historically been the case. 
To this end, I make fourteen recommendations. None of them is intended to place a 
large bureaucratic overhead on the UK government‘s transparency programme, nor 
should there be any substantial cost implications (certainly not relative to the potential 
gains across the economy by improved transparency). All the recommendations are 
supported by the reflections above. Some will require ongoing effort, others could be 
implemented immediately. 
There have been some ideas floated in the text above which I have not included in the 
recommendations (for instance, my hope that the field of differential privacy might in 
time contribute to our understanding of privacy, in section 4.3.3, or that a practical 
architecture for citizens‘ consent management may emerge from British research, in 
section 3.1.5). That is not to say that these ideas should be discounted or ignored, but 
they  rest  on  the  potential  of  currently  progressing  research  rather  than  on  proven 
principles or easily implemented systems, and are considerations for the longer term 
only. 
5.2  Conclusions 
The outlines of the conclusions should be clear by now. 
  Privacy is extremely important to transparency. The political legitimacy of a 
transparency programme will depend crucially on its ability to retain public 
confidence.  Privacy  protection  should  therefore  be  embedded  in  any 
transparency programme, rather than bolted on as an afterthought. 
  Privacy and transparency are compatible, as long as the former is carefully 
protected and considered at every stage. 
  Under the current transparency regime, in which public data is specifically 
understood  not  to  include  personal  data,  most  data  releases  will  not  raise 
privacy concerns. However, some will, especially as we move toward a more 
demand-driven scheme. 
  Discussion  about  deanonymisation  has  been  driven  largely  by  legal 
considerations,  with  a  consequent  neglect  of  the  input  of  the  technical 
community. 
  There  are  no  complete  legal  or  technical  fixes  to  the  deanonymisation 
problem.  We  should  continue  to  anonymise  sensitive  data,  being  initially 
cautious about releasing such data under the Open Government Licence while 
we  continue  to  take  steps  to  manage  and  research  the  risks  of 
deanonymisation. Further investigation to determine the level of risk would be 
very welcome. UNCLASSIFIED 





  There should be a focus on procedures to output an auditable debate trail. 
Transparency  about  transparency  –  metatransparency  –  is  essential  for 
preserving trust and confidence. 
In the remainder of the report, recommendations will be made which are intended to 
implement these conclusions without making too strong a claim on scarce resources. 
5.3  Recommendations 
There are fourteen recommendations. Some are quite general, while others suggest 
specific actions to be carried out. Although any or all of them could be adopted in 
isolation,  they  are  mutually  supportive,  and  are  intended  to  work  together  as  a 
package. They are not  intended to  place an excessive administrative or budgetary 
burden on government. They should allow the transparency programme to progress 
while preserving the confidence of the British public. The ideas are intended to appeal 
across party political boundaries, and to parties in both the Coalition government and 
the opposition. I also hope that these recommendations will keep the UK transparency 
programme to remain in the vanguard of innovation in this area, while also helping it 
learn from the positive experiences of other governments. UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 1: Represent privacy interests on the Transparency 
Board 
It is vital to preserve public trust and confidence in the transparency programme. To 
that end, as it will prove impossible for the programme to  avoid  questions  about 
personal data, it will be far better to embed privacy protection in the programme itself, 
rather than as a bolt-on or additional component of the procedures. 
The  obvious  way  to  do  this  from  the  top  is  to  include  someone  independent  of 
government in the Public Sector Transparency Board advisory body whose role will 
be specifically to protect citizens‘ privacy. 
Such a person should be recruited to the Transparency Board with an international 
reputation in privacy advocacy, particularly someone with a clear understanding of 
the complex technical and technological issues. The new recruit should be able to 
command the confidence of those concerned with the protection of privacy, and be of 
sufficient stature to defend privacy interests effectively in the Transparency Board. 
One candidate for this would be the Information Commissioner, whose public role is 
precisely that. Furthermore, the IC also has responsibility for promoting freedom of 
information; hence he or she should not be inclined simply to act as a blocking force. 
However, it may be that the IC‘s role as independent of government would preclude 
him or her from this role. It may be that the IC should be seen as independent of, and 
therefore free to criticise, the Transparency Board. That is a reasonable view of the 
IC‘s function, in which case the new recruit for the Board should be sought from the 
wider community. UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 2: Use disclosure, query and access controls 
selectively 
There  is  a  potential  clash  between  the  transparency  agenda,  and  the  increasing 
technical consensus (Narayanan & Shmatikov 2010, Ohm 2010) that disclosure, query 
and/or  access  control  measures  will  be  required  to  allow  anonymised  data  to  be 
released online. 
Such measures would be detrimental to transparency. I have therefore not attempted 
to  suggest  that  they  should  be  used  routinely  in  the  transparency  agenda.  My 
recommendation  is  not  that  disclosure  controls  are  useless  or  too  expensive,  but 
merely  that  their  routine  use  cannot  be  a  part  of  the  transparency  programme  as 
currently conceived. 
This should not be taken to mean that personal data can be released without controls. 
It should be taken to mean that: if a data release were potentially privacy-threatening, 
and  if  disclosure/access  controls  could  remove  the  threat,  then  they  should  be 
considered. If resources did not permit the implementation of such controls, then the 
data could not be released. 
Hence  controls  are not  ruled out,  and could  be used in  certain  circumstances (cf. 
section 4.3.2). The particular measures that are likely to have a role are: 
  Consent. 
  Use of terms and conditions. 
  Use of registration to identify users. 
  Charging. 
The circumstances where their use could be valuable include: 
  Where there are identifiable risks from releasing the data. 
  Where the data are not overtly sensitive in themselves. 
  Where government departments and agencies could be confident that the costs 
to them would be made up by wider economic benefits. 
  Where there is keenly-expressed demand and a willing user base for the data. 
  Where  the  barriers  to  entry  to  the  market  are  not  high  enough  to  deplete 
competition. 
  Where the generation of the data by the government department or agency 
demands substantial investment. 
Control systems should be considered when: 
  Having  them  in  place  makes  a  data  release  possible  where  it  would  not 
otherwise be possible. 
  Their presence would have a positive effect on the quality of the data being 
released. 
Not all the relevant considerations here are concerned with privacy, though they will 
cover a number of privacy-threatening situations. UNCLASSIFIED 





Standard methods for protecting privacy such as anonymisation should continue to be 
used, even though they cannot give a 100% guarantee that they cannot be undone by a 
sufficiently adept adversary. 
   UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 3: Include the technical paradigm 
Legal  definitions  of  privacy  have  tended  to  dominate  the  debate  in  the  United 
Kingdom and elsewhere. However, these have proved inadequate to provide a clear 
framework  for  analysis  of  privacy  issues,  especially  in  the  context  of  jigsaw 
identification using recently developed deanonymisation techniques. 
To this end, there should be greater awareness of the technological paradigm. This 
should happen in two specific ways. 
1.  Technologically-trained  experts  should  be  brought  into  procedures  for 
deciding whether or not to release particular datasets. A description of how 
this may be done is given in recommendation 7. 
2.  There needs to be a greater awareness of technical issues in the Information 
Commissioner‘s Office (ICO). The ICO has made welcome strides in recent 
months, for example with the appointment of a Principal Policy Advisor in 
this area, and the creation of a Technology Reference Panel. Nevertheless, the 
severe technical demands made by cutting-edge research in deanonymisation 
mean that more effort is needed in this direction. UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 4: Move toward a demand-driven regime 
The transparency programme covers two separate agendas as noted in section 2.1.4, 
an accountability agenda and an information agenda. In its current phase (a year or so 
into the Coalition government), it has concentrated on accountability, and as such has 
something  of  a  ‗top  down‘  feel.  Ultimately,  it  would  be  desirable  to  move  the 
emphasis from accountability to information, providing the raw materials for citizens, 
charities,  intermediaries  and  entrepreneurs  to  develop  a  rich  picture  of  their 
communities, to enable and empower users  to  interact  more effectively with their 
fellow  citizens,  organisations,  companies  and  government.  As  this  happens,  the 
transparency programme should shift to a more demand-driven, ‗bottom-up‘ regime. 
The Transparency Board is attempting to serve both the accountability agenda and the 
information agenda, but (notwithstanding the presence on the Board of a successful 
information entrepreneur and other advisors who have experience in the use of data by 
citizens) attempts to suggest which datasets might be useful for citizens in real-world 
contexts are naturally somewhat hypothetical. 
In a demand-driven regime, information entrepreneurs would ask for the datasets they 
felt they needed, or felt that they could use to create value, whether social value or 
commercial value (profit) for their own firms. This suggests two requirements. 
1.  Entrepreneurs must know what datasets there are. 
2.  There must be a screening process to ensure that privacy-threatening releases 
(and other problematic releases, such as ones which might threaten national 
security) could be challenged and blocked. 
These two requirements will be the subject of the next two recommendations. 
A  demand-driven  regime  would,  as  argued  in  section  2.2.2,  pose  some  threats  to 
privacy that are not currently on the horizon in the present context. These threats are 
not  terminal,  and  should  be  addressed  using  the  procedure  outlined  in 
recommendation 7. 
However, it is worth noting here that in two respects a demand-driven regime would 
promote  privacy.  First,  it  would  be  incumbent  on  those  demanding  the  data  to 
demonstrate conclusively that it was either not privacy-threatening to release them, or 
that their release, and the use to which they would be put, were of overwhelming 
public interest and proportionate compared to the privacy threat. If such a case was 
robustly expressed and rigorously scrutinised, this would be a good indicator of the 
likely threat to privacy  of that particular release. This compares favourably to the 
current  situation,  where  the  release  of  data  is  uncontextualised  with  a  small 
understanding  of  the  demand  side.  As  noted  in  section  3.1.4,  privacy  norms  and 
expectations are highly context-dependent, and very difficult to state convincingly in 
the abstract. 
Second, two important principles, the Purpose Specification Principle, and the Use 
Limitation  Principle  (cf.  section  3.1.2)  are  in  tension  with  the  transparency 
programme‘s driving assumptions that serendipitous reuse of data (i.e. gaining value 
from  data  by  its  reuse  by  others  in  unanticipated  contexts  and  for  unanticipated 
purposes)  should  be  facilitated,  and  that  productive  use  of  data  cannot  be  fully 
anticipated by data controllers. The idea of serendipitous reuse does not allow those 
releasing data to specify exactly how they will be used, while the demands of the UNCLASSIFIED 





transparency programme for a small bureaucratic overhead make terms and conditions 
and other access control methods problematic (section 4.3.2 and recommendation 2). 
However, if a case has to be made by someone demanding the data for a specific 
purpose,  then  at  least  those  judging  threats  to  privacy  will  be  in  a  position  to 
understand some likely contexts for their use. 
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Recommendation 5: Create a data asset register 
A register of government data assets should be compiled and publicised. This need 
not be complete (indeed, could not be). The register should set out what datasets were 
controlled,  what  they  contained,  and  what  decisions  had  been  taken  about  their 
release. Possible classifications would include: 
  The  data  are  confidential  and  on  no  account  will  be  released  via  the 
transparency programme. 
  The data are accessible without restriction from the Web on an OGL. 
  The data are accessible from the Web with some restrictions (if access control 
has been deemed useful in this particular case, or if for some reason an older, 
more restrictive licence is in force). 
  The  data  are  not  deemed  confidential,  and  though  not  currently  accessible 
from  the  Web,  they  are  scheduled  for  release  in  a  named  format  at  an 
appointed time. 
  The data are not deemed confidential, and are not currently accessible from the 
Web or currently scheduled for release, in which case a request for them can 
be lodged and processed. 
The asset register could be centrally curated, or kept by individual departments and 
agencies. 
In the case of confidential data, it is important for metatransparency (section 3.4) that 
citizens  are  aware  of  what  information  government  holds  even  if  it  is  not  made 
available. When citizens use public data to build pictures of their communities, they 
need  to  know  whether  such  pictures  are  complete,  or  whether  certain  aspects  are 
under-represented. There is nothing necessarily sinister in keeping data confidential, 
but the fact of the restriction should be made clear (so it could be challenged in public 
debate, by an official such as the IC, or even in the courts). 
Note also that the creation of a register, and its use by information entrepreneurs, is 
likely to improve the quality of government data, by providing feedback to influence 
collection  methods,  ontological  assumptions,  quality,  reliability,  timeliness,  output 
formats and so on. 
Given the register, entrepreneurs should be able to ask for particular datasets which 
were currently unavailable. Note: 
  This  would  not  entitle  the  requester  to  exclusive  use  of  the  data.  The 
presumption would be that the data requested would be placed on the Web via 
some access point such as data.gov.uk. 
  If data of a particular type were requested, the request should be expanded to 
cover all data of that particular type. For instance, if someone requested data 
about, say, GPs‘ earnings in Welwyn Garden City, the data to be considered 
for release should be about all GPs‘ earnings. 
In other words, an information entrepreneur should not be able to frame a request to 
him or her a competitive advantage over others via an information asymmetry. If the 
request was granted, the result should be an increase in public good. 
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Recommendation 6: Create sector transparency panels 
Requests for data should be considered by a competent body. This should be below 
the level of the Transparency Board, which should keep its strategic advisory role. 
The most logical step is to create dedicated transparency panels distributed across 
sectors. These bodies  should  determine,  among other things,  whether there was a 
prima facie privacy threat from the release. If not, then there would be no privacy 
objection to the information‘s release, and an instruction should be sent to that effect 
to the government department or agency controlling the data, which should then work 
to place the dataset on its release schedule. The panels could help manage demand by 
influencing release schedule ordering. 
In most cases, it would be helpful for a sector panel to cross ministerial or agency 
boundaries, to prevent the panel being ‗captured‘ by a particular ministry or agency. 
However in some areas (e.g. transport), that may not be possible. 
I will not make any specific recommendation about the size or composition of sector 
panels,  or  indeed  which  sectors  should  be  served  with  panels.  It  is  worth 
experimenting to determine best practice. Furthermore, it may be that different sectors 
have different requirements (e.g. in health, it may be best to proceed cautiously and 
rigorously,  and  so  to  have  a  sector  panel  with  a  wide  and  diverse  membership, 
whereas in other areas, e.g. transport, the panel could be smaller and nimbler). 
However,  the  procedure  I  shall  suggest  in  recommendation  7  will  influence  the 
composition of the panels, or at least the rosters of experts upon whom they will draw. 
For instance, each panel should have access to technical advisors if it did not already 
include them in its membership. 
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Recommendation 7: A procedure for pre-release screening of data to 
ensure respect for privacy 
For reasons set out in section 1.3.1, I shall not be recommending any strict set of rules 
or  institutions.  Rather,  I  set  out  a  broad  outline  of  a  procedure  that  could  be 
implemented in a number of ways. The aim is to suggest a method of pre-release 
screening that will work in a variety of contexts, including currently, as well as in a 
more demand-driven regime. 
Note  that  this  means  that  I  will  not  provide  a  method  of  squaring  the  circle  of 
releasing deanonymisable data on the Web. This is not a problem that can be solved; it 
involves a set of risks and potential benefits that can be evaluated. This evaluation 
will  depend  on  the  current  state  of  knowledge,  public  opinion  and  political 
preferences.  It  will  depend  on  whether  the  transparency  programme  has  proved  a 
success or not. It will depend on public attitudes to privacy, which are evolving very 
rapidly all the time. 
The  debate  and  discussion  should  be  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  and  hence  this 
recommendation will not include criteria for making the decision, or red lines which 
should never be crossed. These will be a matter for policymakers and public at the 
time of a data release. 
Note also that there is a nascent infrastructure in place already that might be built 
upon  –  OPSI‘s  public  sector  information  unlocking  service 
(http://unlockingservice.data.gov.uk/)  is  designed  to  allow  people  to  ask  for 
information, and also has a screening service based on the Freedom of Information 
Act principles. 
How would such a procedure work?  I envisage a sequence of  stages  such as  the 
following. To repeat, the exact set of institutions that implements these procedures 
need not be specified here, especially as the transparency programme is in an early 
phase and is bound to evolve over time. And although I have assumed a demand-
driven  transparency  process,  this  procedure,  beginning  at  stage  C,  would  also  be 
appropriate for the current top-down context. 
A.  Maintenance of a data asset register 
See recommendation 5. 
B.  User demand 
Information entrepreneurs should be able to make requests for data from the data asset 
register, on the bases established in recommendation 5. At this stage, the entrepreneur 
need not disclose the purpose of the request. 
C.  Screening of user requests 
A competent body, which could be the sector panel as envisaged in recommendation 
6, or alternatively could be an ad hoc body accredited by the panel, should then screen 
the request. 
In the event that the body finds a prima facie threat, then the sector panel should be 
able to convene an inquiry to consider the data. 
D.  Consideration of potential privacy threat 
If there was a potential threat, this should be assessed by the inquiry. The assessment 
should consist of rigorous analysis and debate with all relevant stakeholders. These UNCLASSIFIED 





stakeholders  consist  of  representatives  of  at  least  the  following  five  groups  of 
interested parties. 
a.  Those tasked with increasing transparency and publishing public data. 
b.  Those tasked with protecting privacy. 
c.  Domain experts. 
d.  Technical experts with understanding of deanonymisation techniques and the 
current threat model. 
e.  The information entrepreneur(s) who made the original request. 
The role of the domain expert is to provide expertise about how data are, or could be, 
used in the specific sectoral context – e.g. health, education, university education, 
primary education, etc. The role of the information entrepreneur is to explain the role 
that  he  or  she  envisages  the  data  will  play,  and  to  demonstrate  how  any  privacy 
concerns will be allayed. 
The particular roles  could be allocated to specific individuals ahead of time, or a 
group could be assembled ad hoc. 
The value of debate about this issue was discussed in section 3.2.3, and the content in 
section 3.2.2. The structure of debate would be a matter for the chairperson. However, 
the heuristics provided by Nissenbaum (2010, and see section 3.1.4) give a sense of 
what questions would be relevant and how they should be framed. The issues should 
look at norms and expectations in the domain, and in that context, consider the risks 
and benefits of a data release. 
The debate should as far as possible combine rigour with convenience and cheapness. 
It could take the form of a face-to-face meeting around a table, an extended email 
exchange, or collaboration on a written report. 
One possible output would be a privacy impact assessment (PIA). Particularly in a 
demand-driven transparency regime, there is an issue as to who should accept the 
costs of a PIA associated for a particular release of data. Should it be the data provider 
who will be accountable for a reckless release? Or the entrepreneur demanding the 
data? If the latter, then that will clearly increase the costs of asking for data, as any 
request may of course be turned down. Furthermore, the entrepreneur‘s incentives 
would  all  be  for  transparency  and  against  privacy  if  there  was  a  clash,  possibly 
compromising the legitimacy of any PIA he or she commissions. 
Hence one possible structure is that, if a potentially privacy-threatening release of data 
is planned, the relevant stakeholders listed above should meet and together produce a 
PIA for consideration by data managers. 
There is no reason to think that this will be a costly procedure in the large. Best 
practice and precedents will become available, allowing shortcuts in future decision-
making and clarifying amendments to the data asset register. At present it is of course 
unknown what proportion of requests would need to be dealt with by an inquiry, and 
what proportion of those would be hard cases that would require hours of deliberation. 
It should also be noted that the way that the current transparency regime is working, 
the  number  of  borderline  cases  is  actually  very  small,  both  in  number  and  as  a 
proportion of scheduled releases. Very few datasets containing data that could become UNCLASSIFIED 





personal  data  are  scheduled  for  release.  Therefore,  on  current  assumptions,  this 
assessment procedure is unlikely to be triggered very often. 
If it turned out that this procedure was prohibitively expensive, then that could be 
dealt with extremely easily by raising the bar and turning down more requests at an 
earlier  stage.  If  privacy  questions  were  fundamentally  difficult  and  expensive  to 
resolve, then the transparency programme should err on the side of caution and take 
fewer risks with privacy. This would mean fewer data releases, but also less risk to 
privacy. 
E.  Decision 
The inquiry should either (i) reach a decision about whether, and if so how, the data 
should be released, or (ii) provide a report upon which a decision should be based. 
The  decision  should  include  specification  of  any  level  of  aggregation, 
pseudonymisation or anonymisation required. It may be that aggregated data become 
useless for the entrepreneur‘s purposes, because the low-level patterns that he or she 
is looking for will disappear in the aggregation process. Hence it is vital that the 
entrepreneur is represented in the discussion. 
It  should  also  include  a  recommendation  about  whether  any  access  or  disclosure 
control system (cf. section 4.3.2 and recommendation 2) should be imposed, and if so 
what that system would contribute. As noted in recommendation 2, access control 
systems will act in the interest of transparency if they enable data to be released that 
could not otherwise be released for privacy or other reasons. 
The  decision,  and  its  grounds,  should  be  made  absolutely  clear  and  should  be 
transparent and open to scrutiny. The likely context of use should be stated, from 
information supplied by the entrepreneur. If it has been deemed necessary to invoke 
one of the exceptions listed in Article 8, then the ground for this invocation should be 
made clear. The technical underpinning of the decision should also be evident. 
A sufficient period should be made available for public and media scrutiny of the 
decision before the data are actually released. 
A  procedure  of  the  type  envisaged  here  would  have  a  number  of  important 
advantages. 
1.  It  would  ensure  that  privacy  was  protected,  that  the  public  interest  was 
properly considered, and that an auditable debate trail would exist in the event 
that a legal process was eventually triggered. The debate trail would also be an 
important  resource  for  media  scrutiny,  and  in  the  preservation  of  public 
confidence in the transparency programme (cf. section 3.2.3). 
2.  Each case would be considered on its own merits. Case-by-case analysis is far 
more potent than overarching principles which are hard enough to create and 
which,  if  the  arguments  of  Ohm  and  others  are  persuasive,  will  never  be 
sensitive to individual circumstances (cf. section 1.3.2). 
3.  The arguments  will be addressed, under this  procedure, in  advance of  any 
harms  that  may  result,  resulting  (one  hopes)  in  prevention  rather  than 
identification of fault after the fact. 
4.  The  inclusion  of  technical  experts  ensures  that  their  understanding  of  the 
threats and opportunities in this space is not neglected (cf. recommendation 3). UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 8: Extend the research base and maintain an 
accurate threat model 
As  noted  many  times  in  this  review,  our  understanding  of  the  threats  from 
deanonymisation, both theoretically and empirically, is relatively low. Furthermore, as 
a  new  area  of  government  activity,  our  understanding  of  the  politics  and  public 
perceptions of transparency is also slim-to-vanishing. 
It  is  therefore  likely  to  be  worthwhile  convening  a  working  group  containing 
practitioners  from  industry  to  help  build  up  the  evidence  base  about  cutting-edge 
techniques for risk management in this area, and also about the threats to privacy from 
the latest data analysis techniques. This working group could be managed jointly with 
a professional or learned society. 
More traditional academic research would be very valuable in a number of areas. One 
area where the United Kingdom lags, particularly relative to the United States, is the 
mathematics and computer science of privacy. There are a number of world-leading 
experts  in  the  field  based  in  the  UK,  but  cutting-edge  work  on  topics  such  as 
differential privacy and deanonymisation tends to originate in the US. Privacy science 
is a burgeoning field which is clearly of great importance, and experts in the field will 
become extremely valuable and influential over time. It should become a research 
priority. 
It is important to boost research into privacy in the context of open systems such as 
the World Wide Web, rather than in controlled systems which allow disclosure, query 
and access control. The mathematics of the latter are better-behaved, but open systems 
are the future. The research programme of Web Science has been in place for a small 
number of  years, to  develop  theories of the Web as  an unbounded sociotechnical 
system, and, from the point of view of the issues raised in this report, privacy science 
is quite naturally understood as a branch of Web Science. 
One area where the United Kingdom is in advance of many other nations is research 
into practicable methods for consent management. This is a very hard problem, but 
ongoing projects such as ENCORE and VOME are developing a multi-disciplinary 
foundation for research in this area. Progress in understanding and managing consent 
will enable corresponding progress in several areas of transparency, not restricted to 
transparency programmes of the type discussed in this report. For instance, there are a 
number of important issues with respect to the sharing of personal data with controls 
to  third  parties,  where  effective  consent  management  could  help  preserve  privacy 
while increasing the quantity and quality of legitimate data sharing. 
There are also some low-cost methods of extending crucial areas of understanding, 
exploiting already-existing mechanisms. 
1.  Datalabs. In order to help assess how easy/difficult it is to deanonymise a 
proposed  data  release,  datalabs  (such  as  are  already  run  by  a  number  of 
government  agencies,  including  the  Office  for  National  Statistics  and  Her 
Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs, as well as the Secure Data Service of the 
ESRC-funded UK Data Archive) can be exploited. In a secure environment, 
researchers could be invited to deanonymise a dataset proposed for release, 
bringing whatever auxiliary information they liked to support their quest. In an 
extension of this method, academic researchers could be invited to do the same 
in competition, perhaps for a low-value prize – this sort of ‗hackfest‘ is a well-UNCLASSIFIED 





understood institution in academe, where the main gain is academic kudos. I 
should emphasise that this sort of exercise need not be performed for every 
dataset, but rather should be performed on real or realistic dummy datasets on 
a regular basis in order to educate policymakers on the extent of the real-world 
threat  to  privacy  from  jigsaw  identification.  The  threat  model  currently  in 
place lacks verification and is based to a large extent on intuition (for a rare 
example of the use of this technique to inform us empirically, see Lafky 2009). 
The use of secure datalabs and competitions will inform the threat model. 
2.  Citizens’  panels.  Many  government  departments  and  agencies  conduct 
citizens‘  panels  on  a  regular  basis,  testing  public  opinion  on  a  number  of 
matters.  Even  given  the  demand-driven  regime  of  recommendation  4, 
representation  of  citizens‘  opinions  on  particular  data  releases  would  be 
somewhat second-hand, via the efforts of information entrepreneurs. Citizens‘ 
confidence in transparency is vital – consulting citizens‘ panels could help to 
gauge  and  track  opinion  on  this  somewhat  complex  issue,  and  also  of 
disseminating awareness through the wider population. 
Finally, as part of the threat model, we also need to understand what the business 
model for an adversary would be, and what harms might be precipitated. Whether an 
adversary could actually monetise the effort of deanonymising data is an important 
factor in assessing risk; at the moment, there seem to be few convincing examples of 
how someone may profit from discovering and revealing identities. 
It is important, given the need for public confidence, that the transparency programme 
does  not  outpace  our  understanding  of  the  threat,  or  our  understanding  of  public 
attitudes. However, the need to be anchored in empirical understanding does not mean 
that the transparency programme should be risk averse. The deanonymisation risk is 
unlikely to be large, and public attitudes may well be less concerned with privacy than 
is  often  thought.  Research  to  fill  these  gaps  in  our  understanding  could  be  done 
relatively quickly. However, in general, an incremental approach to data releases, and 
to  levels  of  anonymisation  within  particular  datasets,  will  be  more  privacy-  and 
confidence-preserving in the absence of telling empirical results. UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 9: Create a guidance product to disseminate best 
practice and current research in transparency 
The practice of transparency programmes is, as noted, very new. There will inevitably 
be  a  lot  of  trial  and  error,  and  reinvention  of  the  wheel.  Furthermore,  the  legal 
background is extremely sparse, with relatively little guidance provided by current 
data protection jurisprudence. A particular danger is that governments become too 
averse to risk. While they should be very much aware of the risks to, and properly 
protective towards, citizens‘ privacy, this should not lead them to retrenchment and 
failure to act. A number of experiments in transparency (of all kinds) have been in 
train across the world, and best practice will eventually emerge concerning problems 
practical,  legal  and  moral  (including  ways  of  maximising  use  of  data  without 
compromising citizens‘ privacy). 
Some of the recommendations in this report – in particular recommendations 7 and 8 
– will be important contributions to best practice in this area. Experience in other 
nations,  and  other  types  of  administration  (local  governments,  city  governments, 
health  service  providers,  even  commercial  companies)  will  also  contribute  to  our 
understanding of this burgeoning field. 
The United Kingdom government could play an important part by aggregating this 
experience in a guidance product, highlighting:  
  How authorities and those charged with data sharing manage the processes. 
  How the law is evolving internationally. 
  How threat models are evolving. 
  Where economic gains and losses are to be made. 
  How privacy is being preserved. 
The  product  will  be  in  effect  a  journal  of  best  transparency  practice.  One  of  its 
obvious functions would be to publish, and to act as a repository of, the debate trails 
about privacy and transparency that would occur under recommendation 7. It would 
also  be  an  obvious  route  to  publication  for  the  research  that  I  advocate  in 
recommendation 8. The specific issues of consent management and privacy science, 
discussed in recommendation 8, should be included in the remit. 
Such a guidance product would be a boon in an area where activity is somewhat 
diffuse, and would help create coherence and common standards. The development of 
standards could prompt nations or organisations with fewer resources to become more 
transparent.  The  product  would  also  be  an  important  resource  for  benchmarking 
progress in the UK. 
The recommendation does not dictate the form of the product. One possibility would 
be a website, another would be a magazine existing both online and offline. It could 
either  attract  original  contributions,  or  aggregate  existing  ones  (or  both).  The 
contributions should not be technical, though they should be technically-informed; the 
product  should communicate best  practice to  practitioners. The product should  be 
open access. 
A high-profile and respected editor would be important, and at least the major original 
contributions should be peer-reviewed. A high quality editorial board, made up not UNCLASSIFIED 





only of academics, but also key industrial partners, should manage the product. It may 
be that a learned society could be included as a partner for management and delivery. 
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Recommendation 10: Keep the efficacy of control in the new 
paradigm under review 
Under the current retentive Whitehall culture, privacy receives a lot of protection via 
the  practical  obscurity  engendered  by  the  sheer  difficulty  of  getting  information 
released  in  a  scheduled  manner.  Privacy  is  protected  at  least  partly  because  civil 
servants are reluctant to part with data. Rules for information control go with the grain 
of this retentive culture, and so can be expected to be relatively effective. Even so, 
there have been plenty of well-publicised errors with laptops left on trains. 
If the transparency programme achieves its ultimate aims, then there will be a culture 
shift  in  Whitehall  towards  a  paradigm  of  transparency  and  sharing.  The  default 
question to be asked will no longer be ‗why should I release these data?‘ but rather, 
‗why should I not release these data?‘ In such a culture, privacy-preserving rules for 
information control will go against, rather than with, the grain. It may be that the 
current  rules,  adequate  in  a  retentive  culture,  will  no  longer  be  adequate  in  a 
transparent culture. Civil servants tend to err on the side of caution. Under the current 
paradigm,  caution = retention.  Under  a  new  transparent  paradigm, 
caution = publication. 
Under any regime, one of the greatest threats to privacy where data are collected is the 
accidental (or even malicious) release of data outside the rules, and this will always be 
a risk however carefully crafted the rules are. It should never be assumed that rules 
will be followed perfectly on every occasion. 
Departments  and  agencies  should  ensure  that  the  rules  for  retaining  information 
whose release would threaten privacy remain adequate in a world in which the natural 
assumption is that information should be released. The situation should be kept under 
review. UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 11: Maintain existing procedures for identifying 
harms and remedies 
The question of establishing harms and remedies needs to be considered along the 
lines argued in section 3.3. There are two avenues open to the aggrieved citizen at the 
moment.  First,  he  or  she  can  apply  to  the  courts  for  legal  redress.  This  is  not  a 
satisfactory situation, because in the area of privacy, this provides easier access for a 
rich person than someone of average income. 
The alternative is to apply to the ICO for help, advice and redress. This is clearly a 
more accessible route than the courts, and should stay in place. 
However, it may be that if a large number of cases is generated by the transparency 
programme,  the  ICO‘s  resources  will  be  strained.  In  that  case  –  and  it  must  be 
emphasised  that  there  is  currently  no  evidence  that  this  will  be  the  case  –  then 
additional means for assessing harms and determining remedies must be sought. 
The  ICO  does  have  leeway  to  prioritise  particular  cases,  and  to  treat  related 
complaints as a group, so that a series of similar cases (people affected by the same 
release of data) is judged together. It therefore has some means of coping with a rapid 
increase in complaints. 
The ICO does, however, only have powers to fine, not to award compensation. This 
again should not be immediately considered as problematic, as privacy breaches tend 
to  cause  loss  of  reputation  or  station,  rather  than  financial  losses.  These  may  be 
irreparable, but may not be remediable by financial compensation. However, until we 
have seen the effects of clashes between privacy and transparency, we cannot be sure 
that this will be the case in future. For instance, the determination of the government 
to publish details of contracts with private-sector suppliers might result in financial 
losses that would not otherwise have occurred. In such cases the ICO, though it would 
be able to criticise and fine departments or agencies for malpractice, would not be 
able to award compensation – the complainant would have to seek redress through the 
courts. 
If the ICO‘s workload expanded unreasonably, or if it became clear that many of 
those whose privacy was breached had reasonable claims for compensation, then it 
may be that a new institution should be created to deal with complaints generated by 
the  transparency  programme.  It  might  be  worth  considering  creating  a  data 
ombudsman to adjudicate cases and award compensation where deserved. 
However, until it is shown that the transparency programme does generate a number 
of complaints which cannot be effectively served under the current regime, no action 
should be taken. Note also that if its technical expertise is boosted as recommended in 
recommendation 3, the ICO would be better able to determine the recklessness or 
otherwise of a release of a dataset on the Web. 
The situation should be kept under review, but at present the current regime should 
remain in place. UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 12: Use data.gov.uk to raise awareness of data 
protection responsibilities 
Finally, the Data Protection Act applies to people downloading data from data.gov.uk. 
Whether downloading data counts as an act of processing under the Act is perhaps 
doubtful (is it an act of ‗retrieval‘?). If the data are not used by entrepreneurs in any 
useful way, or only for domestic purposes, or are non-personal data then presumably 
no duties are incurred by them. However, if someone does manipulate personal data 
and  disseminate  the  resulting  output,  then  they  become  a  data  controller  in  the 
meaning of the Act, and incur the relevant duties. In particular, if they take aggregated 
or anonymised data that have been released and reidentify individuals from that data, 
they clearly fall under the aegis of the Act. 
data.gov.uk  should  include  prominent  and  clear  reminders  to  those  downloading 
datasets  of  the  provisions  of  the  Data  Protection  Act,  and  clearly  state  that  best 
practice  includes  not  attempting  to  deanonymise  data.  The  reminders  should  be 
prominent enough to register, should include links to the Act, and yet should not 
interfere with or prevent the downloading of the data. For example, they could take 
the form of banner advertisements. 
Of  course  this  final  suggestion  will  not  deter  someone  who  is  determined  to 
deanonymise  data  for  anti-social  reasons,  and  will  have  little  effect  on  someone 
outside EU jurisdiction or the OECD. But it has a relatively low cost, may prevent 
inadvertent breaches of privacy, and will help spread awareness of data protection 
law. 
   UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 13: Investigate the Vulnerability of Anonymised 
Databases 
To accept the arguments of (Ohm 2010) in full would be to neutralise most of the 
positive  benefits  of  the  transparency  programme.  However,  the  potential  to 
deanonymise, and the impossibility of exercising access or query control, mean that 
releasing anonymised datasets will constitute a small risk to privacy. The extent of 
this risk is unclear; although it is currently extremely low, it may not be negligible. If 
the empirical work to develop the threat model which I recommend above is carried 
out, then our understanding of the risk will become clearer. 
Given the lack of certainty, and given the transparency programme‘s current focus on 
extracting value from anonymised datasets, it would be very valuable to scrutinise the 
latest  sophisticated anonymisation techniques,  alongside  a critique of the practical 
capabilities of known deanonymisation methods. A working group with the requisite 
technical abilities should be convened to investigate the extent of the risk along the 
lines suggested in recommendation 8. On the basis of current knowledge (cf. Lakfy 
2009), the group‘s task will be to confirm the low level of risk, and therefore to 
provide  extra  reassurance  to  those  with  a  legitimate  privacy  concern.  If  the  risk 
appears to be larger than the evidence currently suggests, then a rethink will of course 
be required. 
One  cheap,  quick  and  direct  method  of  testing  the  risk  would  be  to  commission 
researchers  to  try  to  identify  individuals  from  sample  datasets  under  secure 
conditions.  Whether  or  not  the  datasets  could  be  ‗cracked‘,  the  result  of  such  an 
exercise would be a greater understanding of the threat – an undeniable benefit to both 
privacy and transparency campaigners. In particular, valuable information could be 
gathered about where vulnerabilities exist, which parameters are most helpful to those 
trying to deanonymise data, and which levels of aggregation are most appropriate for 
preserving the anonymity of data subjects. 
As  noted  in  recommendation  8,  transparency  practice  should  not  outpace  our 
understanding of the risk. The threat is almost certainly very low, but it important that 
that intuition is backed up with evidence. 
   UNCLASSIFIED 





Recommendation 14: Be transparent about the use of anonymisation 
techniques 
Given  the  importance  of  transparency  about  the  transparency  programme  (section 
3.4),  and  the  value  of  debate  and  research  about  the  deanonymisation  threat 
(recommendations 7, 8 and 13), it will be extremely helpful if agencies are open about 
the techniques that they use to anonymise, pseudonymise or perturb datasets. This will 
facilitate sensible and accurate debate about the risks and benefits of data releases 
(and will not, of course, enable an adversary to reverse-engineer the original database 
of personal data). 
   UNCLASSIFIED 





6  Acknowledgements 
The reviewer‘s thanks go to the following people and organisations who engaged with 
and advised the review process. Many experts will recognise their ideas included in 
the text above, and I am grateful to everyone who gave their time to see me, and who 
invited me to events from which I invariably learned a great deal. Of course, the 
responsibility for the use that I have made of information and ideas lies solely with 
me, and the appearance of a person or organisation in these acknowledgements should 
not be taken to imply their agreement with the arguments of this report. 
Representatives of the following public departments, agencies and offices 
Association of Chief Police Officers 
Cabinet Office 
Department for Education 
Equality and Human Rights Commission 
Her Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs 
Home Office 
Information Commissioner‘s Office 
Local Public Data Panel 
Ministry of Justice 
The National Health Service Information Centre for Health and Social Care 
National Police Improvement Agency 
No.10 Downing Street 
Office for National Statistics 
Transparency Board 
Experts on privacy and/or transparency 
Ross Anderson, Cambridge University 
Paul Aylin, Imperial College, Dr Foster Unit 
Caspar Bowden, Independent Consultant (previously Microsoft) 
Ian Brown, Oxford Internet Institute 
Conn Crawford, Sunderland City Council 
Neil McBride, De Montfort University 
Helen Nissenbaum, New York University 
Will Perrin, Talk About Local 
Chris Pounder, Amberhawk 
Charles Raab, University of Edinburgh 
Edgar Whitley, London School of Economics UNCLASSIFIED 





Representatives of the following non-governmental organisations 









Participants in the following events 
VOME workshop on Delivering Public Services Online, Dec 7
th, 2010 
Demos workshop on The Promise and Perils of Digital Era Governance, Jan 26
th, 
2011 
Guardian workshop on Managing Public Sector Information, Mar 1
st, 2011 
Workshop on Open Government Data and Privacy, Catholic University of Leuven, 
Mar 9
th, 2011 
Intellect workshop on transparency and privacy, Mar 15
th, 2011 
Information Commissioner‘s Office workshop on Privacy and Data Anonymisation, 
Mar 30
th, 2011 
Administration Data Liaison Service‘s workshop on Showcasing UK Administrative 
Data: Innovative Research, Methodologies and Modes of Access, Royal Statistical 
Society, Jul 11
th, 2011 
I  should  like  to  thank  my  employers  at  the  School  of  Electronics  and  Computer 
Science at the University of Southampton, for allowing me the time and space to 
conduct this review. Thanks also to Derine Nelson-Streeter of the Cabinet Office for 
invaluable administrative and diary support,. UNCLASSIFIED 





7  References 
Alastair Allan & Pete Warden (2011). ‗Got an iPhone or 3G iPad? Apple is recording 
your  moves‘,  O’Reilly  Radar,  http://radar.oreilly.com/2011/04/apple-location-
tracking.html. 
Ross  Anderson  (2008).  Security  Engineering:  A  Guide  to  Building  Dependable 
Distributed Systems, 2
nd edition, Indianapolis: Wiley. 
Article  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party  (2007).  Opinion  4/2007  on  Concept  of 
Personal  Data, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf. 
Jane Bailey & Ian Kerr (2007). ‗Seizing control? The experience capture experiments 
of Ringley & Mann‘, Ethics and Information Technology, 9, 129-139. 
BBC Online (2010). ‗German vandals target Street View opt-out homes‘, 24
th Nov, 
2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11827862. 
Helen  Beetham,  Lou  McGill  &  Allison  Littlejohn  (2009).  Thriving  in  the  21
st 
Century:  Learning  Literacies  for  the  Digital  Age  (LLiDA  Project), 
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/projects/llidareportjune2009.pdf. 
Christian  J.  Bonnici  &  Lizzie  Coles-Kemp  (2010).  ‗Principled  electronic  consent 
management:  a  preliminary  research  framework‘,  Proceedings  of  the  2010 
International  Conference  on  Emerging  Security  Technologies, 
http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/EST.2010.21. 
danah boyd (2008). Taken Out of Context: American Teen Sociality in Networked 
Publics, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley. 
Peter Bradwell (2010). Private Lives: A People’s Inquiry into Personal Information, 
London: Demos. 
Ian Brown (2010). ‗Data protection: the new technical and political environment‘, 
Computers and Law, 20. 
Ian Brown,  Lindsey  Brown & Douwe Korff (2010). ‗Using NHS patient  data for 
research without consent‘, Law, Innovation and Technology, 2(2), 219-258. 
Cabinet  Office  (2010).  Coalition  Agreement, 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/coalition_programme_fo
r_government.pdf. 
Cabinet  Office  (2011a).  Transparency:  Publication  of  New  Central  Government 




Cabinet  Office  (2011b).  Transparency:  Publication  of  Tender  Documentation, 









David Cameron (2010). Letter to Government  Departments on Opening Up Data, 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/05/letter-to-
government-departments-on-opening-up-data-51204. 
David Cameron (2011). Letter to Cabinet Ministers on Transparency and Open Data, 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2011/07/letter-to-cabinet-
ministers-on-transparency-and-open-data-65383. 
Ann Cavoukian & Khaled El Emam (2011). Dispelling the Myths Surrounding De-
identification: Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting Privacy, Ontario: 
Office  of  the  Privacy  and  Information  Commissioner, 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/anonymization.pdf. 
Lizzie  Coles-Kemp  &  Elahe  Kani-Zabihi  (2010).  ‗On-line  privacy  and  consent:  a 
dialogue,  not  a  monologue‘,  Proceedings  of  the  2010  Workshop  on  New  Security 
Paradigms (NSPW’10), http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1900546.1900560. 
Lizzie Coles-Kemp, Yee-Lin Lai & Margaret Ford (2010). Privacy on the Internet: 
Attitudes and Behaviours, London: VOME. 
Gareth Crossman with Hilary Kitchin, Rekha Kuna, Michael Skrein & Jago Russell 
(2007). Overlooked: Surveillance and Personal Privacy in Modern Britain, London: 
Liberty,  http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/reports/overlooked-privacy-
report-december-2007.pdf. 
Tore  Dalenius  (1977).  ‗Towards  a  methodology  for  statistical  disclosure  control‘, 
Statistik Tidskrift, 15, 429-444. 
Paul  B.  de  Laat  (2008).  ‗Online  diaries:  reflections  on  trust,  privacy  and 
exhibitionism‘, Ethics and Information Technology, 10, 57-69. 
Denis Diderot ([1775]1995). ‗Encyclopédie‘, in Isaac Kramnick (ed.), The Portable 
Enlightenment Reader, New York: Penguin, 17-21. 
Cynthia  Dwork  (2006).  ‗Differential  privacy‘,  in  Proceedings  of  3
rd  International 
Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), Berlin: Springer, 1-
12. 
Cynthia Dwork (2008). ‗Differential privacy: a survey of results‘, in Proceedings of 
the  5
th  International  Conference  on  Theory  and  Applications  of  Models  of 
Computation (TAMC), Berlin: Springer, 1-19. 
Amitai Etzioni (1999). The Limits of Privacy, New York: Basic Books. 
Archon Fung, Mary Graham & David Weil (2007). Full Disclosure: The Perils and 
Promise of Transparency, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Simson L. Garfinkel (2008). ‗Information of the world, unite!‘ Scientific American, 
Sept 2008, 60-65. 
Charles E. Gilbert (1959). ‗The framework of administrative responsibility‘, Journal 
of Politics, 21, 373-407. 
F.A. Hayek (1945). ‗The use of knowledge in society‘, American Economic Review, 
35(4), 519-530. 
Information  Commissioner‘s  Office  (2011).  Data  Sharing  Code  of  Practice, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/topic_guides/~/media/docuUNCLASSIFIED 







Adam  N.  Joinson  &  Carina  B.  Paine  (2007).  ‗Self-disclosure,  privacy  and  the 
Internet‘, in Adam Joinson, Katelyn McKenna, Tom Postmes & Ulf-Dietrich Reips 
(eds.),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Internet  Psychology,  Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press, 237-252. 
Maria Karyda & Spyros Kokolakis (2008). ‗Privacy perceptions among members of 
online  communities‘,  in  Alessandro  Acquisti,  Stefanos  Gritzalis,  Costas 
Lambrinoudakis & Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati (eds.), Digital Privacy: Theory, 
Technologies and Practices, Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach Publications, 253-266. 
Tim Kelsey (2009). ‗Long live the database state‘, Prospect, 161. 
Kenneth Kernaghan (2000). ‗The post-bureaucratic organization and public service 
values‘, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 66, 91-104. 
Douwe Korff (2003). Report on the Findings of the EC Study on the Implementation 
of  the  Data  Protection  Directive,  European  Commission,  2003, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287667. 
Deborah Lafky (2009). The Safe Harbor Method of De-Identification: An Empirical 
Test,  Office  of  the  National  Coordinator  for  Health  Information  Technology, 
http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/HIPAAWest4/lafky_2.pdf. 
Ninghui  Li,  Wahbeh  Qardaji  &  Dong  Su  (2011).  ‗Provably  private  data 
anonymization:  or,  k-anonymity  meets  data  privacy‘, 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1101.2604v1. 
Steve Lohr (2010). ‗Netflix cancels contest after concerns are raised about privacy‘, 
New York Times, 12
th Mar, 2010. 
Francis Maude (2010). ‗Our plans for government transparency continue apace – but 
we  must  uphold  the  highest  possible  standards  of  personal  data  protection‘, 
conservativehome.com,  15
th  Oct,  2010, 
http://conservativehome.blogs.com/platform/2010/10/francis-maude-mp-our-plans-
for-government-transparency-continue-apace-but-we-must-uphold-the-highest.html. 
Derek  McAuley,  Hanif  Rahemtulla,  James  Goulding  &  Catherine  Souch  (2011). 
‗How open data, data literacy and linked data with revolutionise higher education‘, in 
Louis Coiffait (ed.), Blue Skies: New Thinking About the Future of Higher Education, 
London:  Pearson,  88-93,  http://pearsonblueskies.com/how-open-data-data-literacy-
and-linked-data-will-revolutionise-higher-education/. 
Frank  McSherry  (2010).  ‗Privacy  integrated  queries:  an  extensible  platform  for 
privacy-preserving data analysis‘, Communications of the ACM, 53(9), 89-97. 
John Stuart Mill (1859). On Liberty, London: John W. Parker & Son. 
John  Stuart  Mill  (1861).  Considerations  on  Representative  Government,  London: 
Parker, Son & Bourn. 
Arvind Narayanan (2009). ‗De-anonymization is not X: the need for re-identification 
science‘,  33  Bits  of  Entropy  blog,  14
th  Oct,  2009,  http://33bits.org/2009/10/14/de-
anonymization-is-not-x-the-need-for-re-identification-science/. UNCLASSIFIED 





Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov (2008). ‗Robust de-anonymisation of large 
sparse datasets‘, in Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 
111-125. 
Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov (2009). ‗De-anonymizing social networks‘ in 
Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 173-187. 
Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov (2010). ‗Myths and fallacies of ―personally 
identifying information‖‘, Communications of the ACM, 53(6), 24-26. 
Helen Nissenbaum (2010). Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity 
of Social Life, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
OECD  (1980).  OECD  Guidelines  on  the  Protection  of  Privacy  and  Transborder 
Flows  of  Personal  Data, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l. 
Kieron O‘Hara (2010). ‗Intimacy 2.0: privacy rights and privacy responsibilities on 
the World Wide Web‘, in Proceedings of the Web Science Conference 2010, Raleigh 
NC, http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/18760/. 
Paul Ohm (2010). ‗Broken promises of privacy: responding to the surprising failure of 
anonymization‘, UCLA Law Review, 57, 1701-1777. 
Gavin  Phillipson  (2006).  ‗The  ―right‖  of  privacy  in  England  and  Strasbourg 
compared‘, in Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson (eds.), New Dimensions in 
Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 184-228. 
William L. Prosser (1960). ‗Privacy‘, California Law Review, 48, 338-423. 
Charles  D.  Raab  (1999).  ‗From  balancing  to  steering:  new  directions  for  data 
protection‘, in Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant (eds.), Visions of Privacy: Policy 
Choices for the Digital Age, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 68-93. 
Charles D. Raab (2005). ‗The future of privacy protection‘, in Robin Mansell & Brian 
S.  Collins  (eds.),  Trust  and  Crime  in  Information  Societies,  Cheltenham:  Edward 
Elgar, 282-318. 
Charles  D.  Raab  (forthcoming).  ‗Privacy,  social  values  and  the  public  interest‘, 
Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 
Beate Rössler (2005). The Value of Privacy, Cambridge: Policy Press. 
M. Angela Sasse & Ivan Flechais (2005). ‗Usable security: why do we need it? How 
do  we  get  it?‘  in  Lorrie  Faith  Cranor  &  Simson  Garfinkel  (eds.)  Security  and 
Usability: Designing Secure Systems That People Can Use, Sebastopol CA: O‘Reilly 
Media, 13-30. 
Daniel  J.  Solove  (2008).  Understanding  Privacy,  Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard 
University Press. 
John T. Soma & Stephen D. Rynerson (2008). Privacy Law in a Nutshell, St Paul, 
MN: Thomson/West. 
Latanya  Sweeney  (1997).  ‗Weaving  technology  and  policy  together  to  maintain 
confidentiality‘, Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 25, 98-110. UNCLASSIFIED 





Latanya  Sweeney  (2002).  ‗k-anonymity:  a  model  for  protecting  privacy‘, 
International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, 10, 
557-570. 
Latanya  Sweeney  (n.d.).  Computational  Disclosure  Control:  A  Primer  on  Data 
Privacy  Protection, 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/sweeney-thesis-
draft.pdf. 
Transparency  Board  (2010).  Public  Data  Principles, 
http://data.gov.uk/wiki/Public_Data_Principles. 
Raymond Wacks (2006). ‗Why there will never be an English common law privacy 
tort‘, in Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson (eds.), New Dimensions in Privacy 
Law: International and Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 154-183. 
Raymond  Wacks  (2010).  Privacy:  A  Very  Short  Introduction,  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press. 
Ian Walden (2007). ‗Privacy and data protection‘, in Chris Reed & John Angel (eds.), 
Computer Law: The Law and Regulation of Information Technology, 6
th ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 459-504. 
Michael White (2011). ‗Crime maps: too much information?‘ Guardian Politics Blog, 
1
st  Feb,  2011,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2011/feb/01/crime-maps-too-
much-information?intcmp=239. 
Edgar  A.  Whitley  (2009).  ‗Informational  privacy,  consent  and  the  ―control‖  of 
personal data‘, Information Security Technical Report, 14(3), 154-159. 
Jenny Williams (2010). ‗EC delays revision of data protection directive‘, Computer 
Weekly,  5
th  Aug,  2010, 
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2010/08/05/242267/EC-delays-revision-of-
data-protection-directive.htm. 
James Q. Wilson (1980). The Politics of Regulation, New York: Basic Books. 